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The Imagery Of Clowns: The Art Of Saira Wasim - alt.muslim

2006-10-23T12:00:00.000-04:00

(Link: http://www.altmuslim.com/perm.php?id=1808_0_25_0_C38)

"I believe art and freedom of expression can be used to propagate Islam and create awareness in society," says Pakistani-American artist Saira Wasim.

By Zahir Janmohamed, October 23, 2006

While Islamic art has historically been a rich and varied practice that was encouraged and celebrated throughout the Muslim world, the form has been stifled and discouraged in recent times, especially when it comes to open artistic and political expression. As a result, few Muslim artists have been noticed outside their communities or countries, and even fewer non-Muslims have seen compelling examples of contemporary art from the Muslim world. However, the work of New York based Pakistani artist Saira Wasim is proving to be an exception.

Her work has been described by the New York Times as "exquisite political cartoons that conjure William Hogarth and sometimes borrow directly from Norman Rockwell." Art historian Anna Sloan has said about Wasim that the "contradictions of scale intrinsic to her epic miniatures serve us well in a time of need, bearing witness to tragedies both personal and Dantean in scope."

Wasim's works are part of a current exhibit at the Asia Society in New York called "One Way or Another: Asian American Art Now", which "brings together seventeen artists from across the country who challenge and extend the category of Asian American art. The title of the exhibition, inspired by the 1970s Blondie hit, suggests that there has never been a formulaic way of making or seeing art, either back then or now. Instead, these artists initiate a new set of conversations that highlight the multidimensional ways of conceptualizing and producing art today."

Wasim work both embraces and bends convention by invoking the genre of Mughal miniatures. "She returns," writes Newsweek, "consciously to the tradition of classical Mughal miniature painting. But instead of the hunting, battles and royal entertainments those works depicted, she chooses as her subjects Bush and Blair, Cheney and Rumsfeld, the Iraq war."

Zahir Janhomamed, associate editor of alt.muslim, recently interviewed Wasim to ask her about the imagery and inspiration for her paintings and about the place of the artist within the Muslim community.

What particularly draws you to using themes of Mughal miniatures?

I got my bachelor degree in Miniature paintingfrom the National College of Arts in Lahore, Pakistan. It is worth mentioning that this institute teaches many things to its students, including the importance to locate oneself, our identity in the Indian subcontinent, and examine our role in a global context, especially after 9/11.

I took on miniature painting because I felt more comfortable expressing myself in this discipline. I prefer to express myself using a Mughal style because its strongly narrative and it relates to our own cultural behavior/context within South Asia. Its reflects the South Asian theme of telling stories not only orally, but visually, too. So the medium leaves a lot of room to express oneself. If we are talking about political art, then Mughal arena is the best medium to use.

What's interesting is that each Mughal emperor used this art form for their own political propaganda to glorify their deeds or reign. Sometimes it's very much similar to what certain governments (or channels/newspapers) do with the media, using them for their own political reasons.

In one of your works, you depict Pakistan President General Musharraf riding a merry go round wearing slippers. In another, you show him with Shiva like arms. In another, he is wearing a clown-like costume. Can you explain your use of this imagery? What does it suggest about Musharraf?

It's not something personal about Musharraf. I have a deep respect for him, as he is the president of my country, Pakistan.

But I love to listen to how an ordinary man who has no role in government or policy perceives politics. In fact, most of my political works are derived by hearing discussions of common people on politics.

As for this particular piece, "Marry Go Round," the carousel represents the basic constitutional structure of Pakistan, which is a strong, military regime. The carousal is something that keeps moving and it represents how Pakistan has never able to escape from this ever repeating cycle of military rule.

The idea behind the slippers is to show the irony within Pakistan. Although Pakistan is a nuclear state, its national debt is over forty billion dollars, with annual spending on defense at over $3.5 billion a year. So these slippers show that despite all this, Pakistan is still a poor state with its leaders spending exuberantly and living in luxury

Another great thing about miniature painting is this that it allows the artist to access certain tools, symbols, and vocabulary, which have roots in South Asia history.

For example, some sacred animals and imaginary symbols (like the loin, goat, halo behind the emperor, or symbol of Shiva) are all symbols found within South Asia.

In the piece, "Buzkashi" (goat-grabbing), the painting depicts the "One Man Show" of the military dictator of Pakistan, Pervez Musharaf, sitting on a presidential throne with his imperialism shown with four arms, like the Hindu god Shiva.

The basic constitutional structure of the country evolving around his regime with army generals are celebrating 'martial law' by dancing and wearing Hawaiian sandals. Here the goat symbolizes an innocent public.

As for the imagery of clowns, I never painted Musharraf as a clown but in an environment of clowns. In "Friendship of India and Pakistan-Agra Declaration" Musharraf and former Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee are shown as entertainers but still in military uniform. In fact, I think I have always painted Musharraf in a military uniform, with some paintings showing him with a tiger skin, which represents the extreme power of the military dictatorship in Pakistan.

It's less a statement about Musharraf than it is about the political structure of Pakistan, which seems to be trapped in this carousel-like repetition of history.

How has your work been received in Pakistan? In the US? Have you had much support - if at all - from the Muslim community for your work?

There has always been a misunderstood response from both American and Pakistani audiences. But I take criticism positively because itmakes my work grow.

As for the Muslim community, I don't know. As I mentioned, the work is often misunderstood. Sometimes when people don't understand what the actual picture is conveying, it leads to a negative response.

One of my favorite works of yours is the piece "Lamentation of the Innocence (Genocide)". Can you describe the imagery in this piece?

The idea was taken from the ubiquitous persecution and crime against humanity.

It features figures lay in a huddle mound; animals intertwined with humans all are caught together in a net of death. It offers a simple picture of senseless slaughter of innocence.

What do you think the importance is of art that engages contemporary issues? After the recent cartoon crisis, do you find increased challenges in using art as a vehicle to comment on political affairs that affect Muslims?

Art has always been used as an important vehicle for cultural expression throughout the ages. Much has been said through art about social issues. Likewise, it has also been used as political propaganda of the state because history tells us that artist has always been under a strong state intrusion. I believe that the freedom that is granted artists should be used positively to wake people up against ignorance, to engage people in a certain dialogue for the betterment of humanity. This is what I intend to do through with these tiny paintings.

But unfortunately, there has often been a denial and a very strong condemnation against artistic values and creativity in many Islamic sates. But I believe art and freedom of expression can be used to propagate Islam and create awareness in society. Of course, there is always a limit or a certain boundary, though, from where the artist shouldn't proceed. Prophets and sacred figures of all religions should be excluded from this critical depiction.

If we look at the cartoons in the newspaper Jylland-Posten with a critical eye, they neither had any aesthetic or artistic appeal or any truth about the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). It was just an attempt to insult our Prophet and to hurt Muslims' feelings all over the world.

Recently, I did a painting on the Danish cartoon controversy called "Ignorance is Bliss". It portrays prejudice of the west towards the Muslim world, and vice versa.

Unfortunately Muslims all over the world didn't respond to the Danish cartoons according to the teaching of Islam or the way Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) taught us. By those furious riots, we gave the enemies of Islam further opportunities to mock the teachings of Islam. It's my humble plea to Muslims to unite and answer such ridiculous judgments and criticism against Islam and our Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) peacefully, with reason and logic.

We need to believe in jihad with the pen and brush, not missiles or violence.

Zahir Janmohamed is the co-founder of The Qunoot Foundation and associate editor of alt.muslim.

A Look Back At The 2005 Kashmir Quake - alt.muslim

2006-10-09T12:00:00.000-04:00

(Link: http://www.altmuslim.com/perm.php?id=1799_0_25_0_C38)

One year later, the effects of the 2005 Kashmir earthquake still linger, long after the news cameras have gone. Shenaaz Janmohamed reports back from Pakistan.

By Zahir Janmohamed, October 9, 2006

One year ago, a devastating earthquake struck Kashmir, killing nearly 75,000 and leaving nearly 3.3 million homeless. While many efforts were made to alleviate the immediate humanitarian disaster, the work is still unfinished. alt.muslim's associate editor Zahir Janmohamed recently interviewed his sister Shenaaz, a graduate student at the University of Michigan's School of Social Work, to talk about her experiences in helping the victims of last year's South Asia earthquake, and what remains to be done.

Describe the work you have done since the earthquake in South Asia.

I traveled throughout much of northern Pakistan in the summer of 2005. After I heard about the devastating earthquake that happened on October 8, 2005, I worked with some colleagues to start a drive to raise money to purchase tents for the displaced victims in Pakistan.

I returned in December 2005 and again this summer for a Photovoice project. Photovoice is a participatory arts methodology whereby local citizens - in this case children - are equipped with cameras and photography lessons. They are then given the opportunity to explore these tools as a means of capturing and documenting their environment and experiences.

I paired up with the Aga Khan Development Network and focused our project in the Chakama Valley of Pakistan controlled Kashmir during August of 2006.

To conclude the project, the youth presented their photographs, artwork, and performances for community and family members.

A year after the earthquake, how are the conditions in Pakistan?

Conditions in northern Pakistan vary dramatically depending on where you are located. This past summer while I was working in Kashmir, I expected to see a certain level of advancement in recovery - mostly because I was comparing the ground situation to that of Mansehra, where I was based in December. However in Kashmir - especially very near the "Line of Control" - the people only received aid this past April. That is over six months after the initial earthquake!

In larger cities like Muzaffarbad and Mansehra, there is still a large presence of international NGOs. However, it seemed to me that there was an increasing involvement by local Pakistani NGOs who are trying to move away from a model international dependency towards more self-sustainability.

According to an article in the International Herald Tribune, the 7.6 earthquake killed 80,000 people and displaced 3 million. The paper reports that "Many of the 2,000 children who lost limbs, fingers or toes in the earthquake or its aftermath are still waiting for prosthetics, and funding is scarce." Over 300,000 people still live in makeshift shelter. Both the government and the international community need to do more to respond to these needs.

What is your assessment of the government of Pakistan's response to the victims of the earthquake? What about the international community's response?

The Pakistani response has been mediocre, at best. It is true that much of the infrastructure was not in place to support the level of aid and services needed to respond to the earthquake. That being said, the Pakistani government still insists on dedicating a majority of their spending on military and defense, instead of investing in the people. People affected "received" an arbitrary monetary check as a means to recover their losses, when they need resources and development, not money in which they have no capacity and access to use.

Much of the frustration still lingers today. Most recently, for example, protests were staged in Islamabad the day before the one-year anniversary—demanding justice and an end to corruption.

The international community has also had their share of mishaps. I saw many international NGOs treat people with a lack of dignity. Many adopted a colonialist perspective of "saving" those affected. Many of these groups did not promote citizen participation or value the voices of the Pakistani people as legitimate agents of change. Nor did I see these NGOs use this opportunity to help communities become more sustainable.

What are some of the key issues that you saw in dealing with the survivors?

I saw a lack of participation. The centralization of power by a military dictator is inherently problematic. This domination affects all aspects of life - even how people respond to disasters. It takes time to break norms and to create an environment where peoples' voices are truly valued and incorporated as legitimate sources of knowledge.

For example, some Muslim clerics in part of earthquake-hit Pakistani Kashmir have told aid agencies to fire all local women employees or face violent protests because many conservative Muslims did not want local women working with international workers.

So on many levels, it's going to take time to heal the affected areas.

What was your experience like working with some of the children?

The children were incredibly resilient and strong. At the same time, this experience deeply affected their psyche - their sense of confidence was diminished and their sense of personal safety was shattered. I saw them approach everything with urgency, as there is a fear that tomorrow will never come.

What lessons can be learned about the response to the earthquake?

There needs to be more attention on Pakistan as a viable country with possibilities, instead of constantly looking at it through the lens of terrorism, madrassas etc. As long as certain political actors - both Pakistani and non-Pakistani - continue to concern themselves only with Pakistan's security problems, people in the villages and in rural areas will continue to suffer. The Kashmiris, for example, have not been able to enjoy any sense of security for many years now.

What can be done to help out?

We need to remember that the earthquake is not a problem of the past. A year later, nearly 300,000 remain displaced while Pakistan's military continues to grow. We need to continue to talk about the earthquake and to talk about Pakistan critically. People tend to become very defense of Pakistan, which is partially understandable as it is constantly misrepresented. However unless we engage in critical dialogue about the government and the countrys' development challenges, Pakistan's status quo will remain.

And the earthquake has shown us that the status quo is not working.

Zahir Janmohamed is the co-founder of The Qunoot Foundation and associate editor of alt.muslim.

Life, Class, and Art in "Man Push Cart" - alt.muslim

2006-09-25T12:00:00.000-04:00

(Link: http://www.altmuslim.com/perm.php?id=1790_0_25_0_C38)

Ramin Bahrani deserves credit not only for creating a film that implores us to ask important questions but also reminds us of why it is so easy to ignore them.

By Zahir Janmohamed, September 25, 2006

Like the customers who frequent a New York City street cart but are separated by a plastic window from the vendor inside, "Man Push Cart" gives us enough of a glimpse into the life of an immigrant laborer to remind us of the distance that separates people and especially classes in the United States.

The film, the directorial debut from Iranian-American film maker Ramin Bahrani, focuses on the story of Ahmad, a push cart vendor played brilliantly by Ahmad Razvi (himself once a street vendor). But similar to the snippets of information we might gather about from a taxi driver during a conversation on a 20 minute ride, we learn very little about the film’s protagonist. This is the film’s greatest strength.

In one scene, Bahrani takes us inside Ahmad's cart and we see a close up of a of a coffee cup, with the upper half of a woman's face in the background, talking to her friend as she waits for her bagel. Rather than have her voice drown out the noise of the coffee machine (as we might hear if we were the customer), we instead hear the slow drip of the coffee machine and the near silent movements of Ahmad within the cart. It's a telling visual that Bahrani is wise enough not to cloud with needless words. Part of this, no doubt, is homage to the great Iranian film maker Abbas Kiarostami - whom Bahrani credits for teaching him - to “say the most with the least” and to pay “attention to ‘life’ as opposed to the roller coasters of melodrama.”

As a result, the film wisely focuses on the imagery of the daily rigor and monotony of Ahmad’s life. In a scene that repeats throughout the film, we see Ahmad waking up at 2:30am, stock his food cart, and pull it through the streets of New York as cars pass by without notice. We do not, however, hear Ahmad talk throughout these scenes and as a result, the viewer is left to write his/her own script about what Ahmad may be thinking. It’s a clever tactic that retains a bit of distance between us and Ahmad, one that plays out much like when we see cart vendors in our own lives and often wonder (that is if we chose to wonder) what path may have led them to that profession. In another scene, we see Ahmad carrying around a petroleum gas tank, something he carries for most of the film, including in one scene when he goes out to a Karaoke bar. It’s a striking image that makes us examine how Ahmad’s profession defines and stigmatizes him, even when he is not at his stand.

What makes “Man Push Cart” resonate is the powerful performance by Razvi. In an interview with the director, Bahrani talks about how he made Razvi unload equipment, pull the street cart, and minimize his sleep during the shooting so that he could “exhaust him over the course of filming, just as his character was in life.” The result is that Razvi character has a glazed look of absence and fatigue that greatly enhances the look of the film.

Soon Ahmad meets Mohamed, a wealthy New Yorker, who also hails from Lahore like Ahmad. They both exchange a few words and both confess that they have lived away from Pakistan for “too long to stay.” Mohamed, skillfully played by Charles Daniel Sandoval, later employs Ahmad to work odd chores around his spacious New York apartment. Mohamed shows little regard for Ahmad until he realizes that Ahmad was once a famous rock star in Pakistan - “the Bono of Pakistan” - and that the two even attended many of the same parties in Lahore. It’s a revelation that alters the dynamic between Mohamed and Ahmad. Suddenly Mohamed now wants to hang out with Ahmad and even offers “to help in any way.”

The interaction between Mohamed and Ahmad is a deft commentary on classism within South Asian culture and Bahrani deserves credit for unraveling the dynamics of status within Pakistani society. While Mohamed shows newfound interest in his “friend”, Ahmad never quite reciprocates the friendship or trust. It’s a telling example of how upper class immigrants often feel an affinity towards their lower class countrymen that they do not reciprocate.

Watching Ahmad’s cautious distance between Mohamed, I recalled the many times when I often try to strike up a conversation with a Muslim (or South Asian or Arab) taxi driver only to be sometimes rebuffed by a rude or oblivious response. But is this trepidation not justified? While we may be eager to talk up our neighborhood halal cart vendor or Muslim taxi driver, would we do the same if we saw that person, say, at the mosque?

The strength of “Man Push Cart” is that although we may want the director to make us see the world as a street vendor, Bahraini instead casts us as the customer - albeit a customer with a more intimate view into a laborer’s life. The result is that the viewer is left not only to piece together Ahmad’s life (Why did his wife die? Why did he come to the US?) but also to ask why don’t we know more about people like Ahmad? What barriers exist in our own lives that prevent us from exploring his story?

Bahrani deserves credit not only for creating a film that implores us to ask these questions but also reminds of why it is so easy to ignore them.

Zahir Janmohamed is the co-founder of The Qunoot Foundation and Associate Editor of alt.muslim. "Man Push Cart" is now playing in select US cinemas and opens in the UK on October 6th.

Movie Review: "Islam: What The West Needs To Know" - alt.muslim

2006-07-17T12:00:00.000-04:00

(Link: http://www.altmuslim.com/perm.php?id=1742_0_25_0_C38)

Zahir Janmohamed tells you what you need to know about a new documentary that purports to, well, tell you what you need to know about Islam.

By Zahir Janmohamed, July 17, 2006

In my favorite scene in the film Monty Python and the Holy Grail, a group of villagers brings forward a woman who they accuse of being a witch. They reason that since witches burn because they are made of wood and if wood, like a duck, floats, that: "If... she... weighs... the same as a duck... she's made of wood... And therefore?... A witch!"

If this same flawed logic is employed, then Islam: What the West Needs to Know can properly be considered a film. It is slapped together with the same cinematic finesse as an in-flight safety video and peppered with special "effects" and talking head "experts" one would only find in a Monty Python skit and, well, this "film."

The producers are Quixotic Media, an unnamed team (at least on their website) that "seeks to take on issues of social significance that major media will not." The end credits list the producers/directors as Gregory M. Davis and Bryan Daly, both people with names generic enough that my Google searches did not produce any information about them, nor does their website says much else about them and I should note looks as if it has been put together by a seventh grade student begrudgingly taking a web site design class. (Note #1 to producers: fire your web designer.)

The central thesis of the film is that contrary to what western leaders may say, Islam is not a religion of peace. The film starts with a series of clips from President Bush and Prime Minister Blair who each say that Islam is not a religion of violence. The film's website notes, "Virtually every major Western leader has over the past several years expressed the view that Islam is a peaceful religion and that those who commit violence in its name are fanatics who misinterpret its tenets." Aside from Bush's problematic understanding of peace (in which even the likes of Ariel Sharon is called a man of "peace"), the directors fail to see how statements like this often constitute political posturing meant to distract from often bellicose, discriminatory, or lop-sided policy. The films two clips of Bush and Blair are, ironically, speeches announcing the commencement of the Iraq war. They also fail to to mention that many western leaders - Silvio Berlusconi, Vladimir Putin, General Boykin, for example - have made little effort to hide their contempt for Islam and its adherents.

The directors believe we have been duped. The result is a comically self-righteousness 98-minute film that seeks to correct (and to warn) the west one simple thing: Islam is not what you think. It's a religion of violence. "What part of kill don't you understand?" one "expert" says, looking deadpan. It's a priceless moment that should ideally be punctuated by a scene of a burly man taking a large bite out of an oversized, chicken drumstick.

The film is divided into six parts, each part bearing a catchy name like "more than a religion." Interspersed between the interviews with the film's six or seven "experts," are quotes from the Qur'an or hadith read by the film's narrator who would win hands down in a contest to impersonate Steven Colbert's fake news voice. As the narrator speaks, we see the shot of a fuzzy Mughal miniature, which truthfully looks like an ancient rendition of Jimi Hendrix and his burning guitar. (Note #2 to producers: invest in a better scanner and art research department next time.)

But a summer film would be remiss without special effects and "Islam: What the West Needs to Know" is not without them. In my favorite segment, we see a bird's eye view of a computer generated world map as the narrator talks about the conquest of Islam throughout the world. Each time the narrator mentions a country that Muslims invaded, a small fire lights up in that country. Did the producers really expect to include such sophomoric tricks and yet also be taken seriously? (Note #3 to producers: Qatar is missing on one of your maps.)

Aside from the film's homage to cheesy South Asian wedding video special effects, we are subjected to hearing five or six talking heads offering their "expertise." One of them is Robert Spencer, a Frontpage magazine columnist and current director of JihadWatch. He sprinkles his observations about Islam with a liberal use of Arabic terms, as if somehow this is supposed to impress us. There can be a peaceful Muslim, he tells us, but not a peaceful Islam. Later in the film, he credits Edward Said as someone who Islamized Middle Eastern Studies in the US and wrote his seminal Orientalism to silence critics of Islam. It's a scene that is more embarrassing than offensive.

Another expert we hear from his Srđa Trifković, a Serbian historian who served as a spokesman for the Bosnian Serbian government. He has called the rape of Bosnian women "entirely fictitious" and once said, "For a Christian the real task is to help our fellow humans who are trapped in Islam and to help them become free." His comments in the film are so absurd that to respond would only be to give credence to his assertion of being a "historian."

The film does, however, have its redeeming moments. Bat Ye'or, an Egyptian born British Jew whose books include titles like The Decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam, offers a useful grammatical lesson on to use the word infidel in a sentence. She sprinkles her commentary with sentences like "Islam is a religion started to fight infidelity and to bully infidels until they rid the infidels of their infidelity." Its no wonder that Sidney H. Griffith in the International Journal of Middle East Studies writes of her: "The problems one has with the book are basically twofold: the theoretical inadequacy of the interpretive concepts jihad and dhimmitude, as they are employed here; and the want of historical method in the deployment of the documents which serve as evidence for the conclusions reached in the study. There is also an unfortunate polemical tone in the work."

My favorite commentator in the "film" is Walid Shoebat, author of Why I left Jihad. A native of Palestine, he compares joining a Palestinian terrorist group to rushing a fraternity. "The martyrdom applications were full," he says. "We had initiation ceremonies which included killing a Jew." But his story lacks credibility. Perhaps this is because he seems too eager to denigrate his old self in order to self-aggrandize his present post-Islam enlightenment. In one scene, he talks about watching CNN at work during the first Gulf, when he was still a terrorist sympathizer. "Watching the TV with my colleagues at work I had to restrain my excitement when I saw the American targets being hit by Sadaam," he said. "I would drive home from work with my windows open, put my head out the window, and shout Allah-u Akbar the entire way home," he says. It's a visual that just begs comparison to Jim Carrey's driving antics in "Ace Ventura." The question is - how do you go from that form of (silly) zealotry to Fox News Islam basher and Zionist apologist in just ten years?

There are many more oddities like this in the film, including clips of Muslims speaking at rallies and Friday prayers, etc. One of the clips, to the credit of the producers, is powerful and disturbing because it shows a group of British Muslims who chant that they will destroy England and then take their women as war booty. But the other clips are odd selections, including one from a Friday prayers at a Sunni, Baathist mosque in Iraq on the eve of US invasion. Should we blame the audience and the khatib for feeling a bit testy just days before the "shock and awe" campaign? (Note #4 to producers: If you want to show Muslims looking bad, you will have to do more than show a bunch of uncles in ill-fitting salwar khamezes. Perhaps you should show footage about honor crimes in Pakistan or sectarian violence in Iraq, both examples of the often-deplorable tendencies of some Muslims.)

How then should Muslims regard this film? To call it offensive is as painstakingly obvious as saying that water is wet. The more important question is whether the film is inciteful. I am disinclined to believe so. Inciteful films - and oddly I have seen a fair share - succeed by emotionally manipulating the audience and directing their rage at a given community, implicitly urging often-violent action. But "Islam: What the West Needs to Know" is benign because it is likely to be regarded as authoritative only by that rare sub-segment of society that finds reality shows like "Wife Swap" to be high culture.

That indeed may be its redeeming quality - the film is as flawed and deceitful as a businessman hawking a pyramid scheme.

And we all know that no one, of course, has ever fallen for a pyramid scheme.

Zahir Janmohamed, co-founder of The Qunoot Foundation, is still trying to figure out the air speed velocity of a swallow carrying a coconut.

A Much Needed Head-Butt - alt.muslim

2006-07-13T12:00:00.000-04:00

(Link: http://www.altmuslim.com/perm.php?id=1738_0_25_0_C38)

In 1998, Zidane emerged a hero for guiding France to victory. Eight years later, Zidane again emerges as a hero, albeit for different reasons.

By Zahir Janmohamed, July 13, 2006

In the end, Zidane did in fact end his career without regrets. When he head-butted Italian player Marco Materazzi, millions of fans - myself including - all thought it was an action that he would later regret. But in his first interview since the event last Sunday, he apologized to the children around the world who witnessed his reaction but stopped short of showing regret or extending an apology to Matterazzi. "I tried not to listen to him but he repeated them several times," Zidane said. "Sometimes words are harder than blows. When he said it for the third time, I reacted. The reaction must be punished but if there had been no provocation there would have been no reaction."

The question then is what prompted a man who has been called the "Bob Marley of soccer" to respond this way and to later show no remorse?

The best clue to understanding Zidane is to look at his upbringing. The famously shy Zidane was born on June 23, 1972 in the immigrant neighborhoods of Marseille, France, the son of Kabyle Algerian immigrants. He has said of his childhood, "It's hard to explain - I have a need to play intensely every day, to fight every match hard. And this desire never to stop fighting is something I learned in the place I grew up. And, for me, the most important thing is that I still know who I am. Every day I think about where I come from, and I am still proud to be who I am: first, a Kabyle from La Castellane, then an Algerian from Marseille, and then a Frenchman." Much has been written lately of the tough neighborhoods where Zidane grew up of which he says, "I was lucky to come from a difficult area. It teaches you not just about football but also life. There were lots of kids from different races and poor families. People had to struggle to get through the day. Music was important. Football was the easy part."

Football, indeed, did seem like the easy part. He was discovered at age 14 by a talent scout who described him as a "genius" and later went on to careers with the French soccer teams AS Cannes, Bordeaux, Italian team Juventus F.C., and finally Spain's Real Madrid.

Little else, however, is known about him. There are very few details about his wife and kids (unlike the very public Ronaldo or David Beckham whose private lives are perhaps too well known). We do know that for much of his career, he has endured accusations (by players on the field, by fans, and even some by fellow Algerians) that his father was a harki, an offensive Arabic word that, according to Wikipedia, "was the generic Algerian term for Muslim Algerians serving as auxiliaries with the French Army, during the Algerian War of Independence from 1954 to 1962. Reports show that Zidane is particularly close to his father and ascribes much of his work ethic from him. He once told an Algerian journalist, "I'm very inspired by him. It was my father who taught us that an immigrant must work twice as hard as anybody else, that he must never give up."

When France hosted the World Cup in 1998, it was a new France on display. The French team boasted the likes of, as right wing French politician Jean-Marie Le Pen would say, "not very French" players Thiery Henry, Patrick Vieira, Zidane, and others. Off the field, cities like Paris were brimming with large, mostly Arab immigrant populations, many of whom still struggle to find acceptance against the backdrop of France's de jure and de facto discrimination. But despite efforts of the likes of Le Pen to thwart the popularity of the team, the French people then - and even now - stood behind Zidane as he led France to its first World Cup victory. It was Zidane's header then, albeit a legal one, that scored the decisive goals of that game. The next day, an estimated 500,000 people (the largest crowd since the French Revolution, some say) poured onto the Champs-Élysées to honor the French team and specifically Zidane. Many chanted "Zidane pour le president." It was historic moment for to hear the collective chants of Frenchmen routing for a team that was "Black, Blanc et Beur" or black, white and North African.

But the ecumenism after the 1998 World Cup victory did not last long. In October 2001, the comments against Zidane's family escalated to an unbearable level. In a "friendly" match between Algeria and France, the two teams squared off for the first time since Algeria's independence. The purpose of the game was to mend relations and build ties based on a common affinity for soccer. But just the opposite occurred. According to the Observer, "The reality was grotesque. In the lead-up to the match Zidane received death threats. During the game, he was booed and taunted and, he says now, was 'disconcerted' by the posters that read 'Zidane-Harki'. The match was abandoned after a pitch invasion in the second half, with young French Arabs chanting in favor of bin Laden and against the French state. The multicultural adventure launched by the French team of 1998 was in disarray. The far right was on the move."

Fed up by the insulting (and provocative) comments about his father, Zidane later broke his usual silence and said, "I say this once and for all. My father is not a harki. My father is an Algerian, proud of who he is and I am proud my father is Algerian. My father never fought against his country. Being Algerian, and proud of it does not mean that I am not French."

Zidane's new prominence after the 1998 World Cup prompted a flurry of political, religious, ethnic, and national groups to try to use him as their spokesman. But Zidane was not interested, saying famously that he had "no message."

This did not stop the likes of France's right wing Jean-Marie Le Pen from calling Zidane a "a son of French Algeria," implying that somehow France's brutal colonization of Algeria somehow deserves credit for producing a legend like Zidane.

But although Zidane was frequently provoked, he never responded - at least publicly - to the provocation. This was no easy feat, given the unfathomable degree of racism still present in European soccer today. In a riveting ESPN documentary, various players speak about being verbally taunted with monkey chants or being pummeled by bananas from audience members. In one segment, the fans at one Italian game are shown making the Nazi salute, chanting monkey noises and throwing bananas at Ivorian player Marc Zoro. Finally in the middle of the game, Zoro is shown grabbing the game ball and walking off the field in tears. He later told reporters, "I have been playing in Italy for three years and I see this happening almost daily. All this makes me really sad. It's not easy for me and it hurts. I don't deserve this."

Part of the fault is that FIFA has responded lackadasically to incidents of racism. Recently the Spanish national team coach Luis Aragones recently told his player to show England's Rio Ferdinand to "show that black little shit that you are better than him". What compounded the incident was that each time a non-white player on England touched the ball during their "friendly" with Spain, the Spanish crowd would make monkey noises. The fine for Aragones remark? A paltry $4000, the equivalent of a day's wage for him. Some wondered why FIFA did little to reprimand somehow the Spanish fans for their inexcusable behavior.

Of course others insist that the solution is for the players to rise about the racism and not let it affect their player. Politics, it is often said, has no place on the field. But when Thierry Henry walks on a Spanish soccer field and is taunted by monkey chants from the audience, is it Henry that is bringing his politics to the field or the audience? Is it fair to expect him not to respond?

For many American authors, Zidane's event has already been compared to "infamous" moments of rage in sports like Mike Tyson's in- ring ear biting or Bill Lambeer's entire career. But if in fact Matterazzi's provocation were racially tinged, then it might have conjured up a very real experience of enduring racism, discrimination, and xenophobia for Zidane.

Some say Zidane showed more restraint in dealing with these issues in 1998. But consider the events that have transpired since France's 1998 World Cup victory, especially the 2005 French riots, in which one person was killed, 2,888 people were arrested, 8,973 vehicles damaged, and an estimated €200 million in property damages. Much of the anger displayed during that violence was retribution for the overt discrimination against immigrants in France. In an article published on November 2, 2005, the BBC reported, "Racial discrimination is banned in France. But a quick look at the people working in any shop or office suggests the practice is widespread. The impression is confirmed by official statistics. Unemployment among people of French origin is 9.2%. Among those of foreign origin, the figure is 14% - even after adjusting for educational qualifications." According to the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies, unemployment overall for university graduates is around 5%, it is 26.5% for "North African" university graduates, many of them French born. If France's embrace of its diverse World Cup team showed that nation's willingness to welcome immigrants to its soccer team, then the rest of French society has yet to show that same acceptance of immigrants in society. At some level, Zidane's head butt was an empowering gesture of protest and intolerance against racism. With ten minutes left in the game, Matterazi's provocation reminded Zidane that no matter how much fame, fortune, or adulation that he acquires, Zidane still confronts racism. Is it fair to blame him for being angry or fed-up?

In 1998, Zidane emerged a hero for guiding France to victory. Eight years later, Zidane again emerges as a hero, albeit for different reasons. This year Zidane did not hold the prestigious World Cup gold trophy, but then again, not all trophies are made of gold.

Zahir Janmohamed, the co-founder of The Qunoot Foundation, never thought he would write an article in defense of a man whose (middle) name is Yazid.

"Everyday Is Ashura, Every Land Is Karbala" - alt.muslim

2006-02-27T12:00:00.000-05:00

(Link: http://www.altmuslim.com/perm.php?id=1666_0_25_0_C)

Whereas violence against Shiites manifests itself in the form of targeted killings in Pakistan and in Iraq, violence against Shiites in the U.S. manifests itself in the form of hate speech.

By Mohamed H. Sabur, February 27, 2006

Growing up as an American Shiite Muslim in the United States, the annual recounting of the killing of Imam Husayn, the third of 12 Shiite Imams to succeed the Prophet Muhammad, had a profound effect on my socialization. What struck me then - and even more now after the Al-Askari Mosque bomb blast - was in learning that Imam Husayn was killed by a purported Muslim, the Umayyad caliph Yazid.

The popular repeated notion in recent years that Islam has been "hijacked" is a foreign construct. As a child, the hijacking of Islam was recounted each year with Imam Husayn's saga. The story engrained in me the notion that the enemy within myself and within my community is far more erosive, far more threatening than any external, non-Muslim threat.

The bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque was not an attack on Shiites, but on the ethos of Shiism itself. While the majority of Sunnis abhor last week's attack, there is a small minority within the Sunni community that is becoming increasingly more violent and more determined to eliminate Shiites (and Shiism) from any and all lands. The attack in Samarra has resulted in gruesome and indiscriminate Shiite relataliation on Sunni innocents and Sunni places of worship. This must be equally condemned and deplored.

This tide of abuse against Shiites is not limited to Muslim countries. Whereas violence against Shiites manifests itself in the form of targeted killings in Pakistan and in Iraq, violence against Shiites in the U.S. manifests itself in the form of hate speech.

On February 5, 2006, Shiites of New York City marked the martyrdom of Imam Husayn with a procession through the Upper East Side of Manhattan. It is a tradition that has occurred for many years without nary of a conflict.

This year a group calling itself the Islamic Thinkers Society staged a protest outside the procession to "expose Shiism and the filth they stand for" and to "show that these Shiite heretics do not represent Islam." Many of those present complained of being verbally threatened and the NYPD had to intervene to provide safety to the Shiite mourners.

Five years ago, acts like the protest in New York City were unheard of. Although a rift has always existed between Sunnis and Shiites in the United States, it never resulted in a confrontation against Shiites as we saw in New York.

Sadly, much of this hate speech has trickled down to college campuses where Muslim students are influenced by online learning academies like SunniPath that consider Shiites heretical people to be avoided. With such ideas being peddled, what options do Shiites have to dialogue with Sunnis?

In a survey The Qunoot Foundation conducted in 2004, about the socio-political perceptions of American Shiite Muslims, we found that most respondents did not report Shiite-Sunni relations as improving or becoming more friendly. Equally as troubling, Shiites were far less likely to report hate crimes to national, often Sunni-majority Muslim organizations.

Of course, these Muslim organizations will boast that they condemned the attacks. But it is all too easy to create a paper dragon and then slay it valiantly for the media's sake.

Indeed the majority of Sunnis denounce religious extremism or sectarian hate speech. But mainstream Muslim groups - the Muslim Public Affairs Council excluded - have failed to provide a space within their organizations to discuss intra-Muslim discrimination in the U.S. They have instead provided forums for vacuous dialogue in which the Sunni-Shiite problem is presented as a global sectarian problem where all parties deserve equal blame.

It is not. It is a problem of an unchecked (and thankfully still minority) Sunni bigotry that is festering in Muslim societies and in some parts of the West. Muslims owe it to themselves to admit that basic and crucial fact.

Mohamed H. Sabur is co-director of the Qunoot Foundation, a Washington-based organization focusing on sociopolitical education within the Shiite Muslim community.

Islamophobia, Ashura and some cartoons - Minnesota Daily

2006-02-09T12:00:00.000-05:00

(Link: http://www.mndaily.com/articles/2006/02/09/67050)

Ashura marks the 10th day of the first Islamic month, Muharram, and is viewed as a signficant day.

By Mohamed H. Sabur

top. This madness, this destruction, this abhorrent violence needs to come to an end. Right now and today. The wanton destruction of diplomatic embassies, the burning of effigies and the calls for tit-for-tat responses to the horrendously offensive cartoons printed by Jyllands-Posten must stop here. Why? Because the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, the faith of Islam and the values of the world's great religions instruct us to behave better than this.

According to the Islamic holy book, the Quran, Prophet Muhammad was sent as a mercy to mankind. In a time when women were disrespected, infant girls were killed or mistreated simply because they were born female and slaves could not so much as stand next to their owners, the teachings of Prophet Muhammad came to correct these disdainful social norms and establish love, justice and kinship among human beings. The Prophet Muhammad was a man of mercy and kindness. The depiction presented by Jyllands-Posten could not have been further from the truth.

But at the same time, such provocations on the level of the 12 infamous cartoons can not be a green light for hatred and violence. These occurrences enrage some but should be viewed by all as opportunities for dialogue, for peaceful reconciliation and for the Muslim world to show its compassion toward removing the blindfold of ignorance.

In the midst of the religiopolitically charged atmosphere after last year's bombings in London and riots in France, the evident frustrations of the Muslim community should not have been taken lightly by Jyllands-Posten. Although the newspaper was free to publish those cartoons, it has a responsibility to consider how such cartoons propagate notions of Islamophobia so prevalent in European society.

"We find (the cartoons) offensive, and we certainly understand why Muslims would find these images offensive," the White House noted. "Anti-Muslim images are as unacceptable as anti-Semitic images, as anti-Christian images, or any other religious belief." If our American ideals of freedom of speech and freedom of press are anywhere near universal, then we must also recognize the responsibility of the press.

But why stop today? Why this odd Thursday in February? Because to the world's more than 1 billion Muslims, today also marks the day of Ashura, the 10th day of the first Islamic month, Muharram. Today is viewed as the most significant day for Muslims of all backgrounds outside of the month of Ramadan and serves as a lingering reminder of the brutality of force.

For many, this day marks when the Prophet Muhammad migrated from Mecca to Medina and observed the Jews of that city fasting in honor of God's deliverance of Moses and the children of Israel from the Pharaoh. The Prophet Muhammad, in recognizing the prophetic bonds of brotherhood between himself and Moses, as well as the importance of the Jews' deliverance from the atrocious Pharaoh, commanded the Muslims to observe the fast as well.

The day of Ashura also marks the martyrdom of Husayn ibn Ali, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad and the Third Shiite Imam. In his campaign for nonviolence and the establishment of justice against a tyrant ruler, he was forced to flee the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina. His pleas to the Muslim people from the sands of present-day Karbala, Iraq, to promote virtue and prohibit vice stand as a testament to the nobility of the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. He and his family risked their lives to stand up for justice, a sacrifice that has resonated with Muslims and non-Muslims, including Mahatma Gandhi and Charles Dickens.

This important day not only shows how deep of a connection Islam and Judaism have with each other, but also tells of the universality of the message of the world's great faiths. They not only share an intimate history, but many revered prophets of God, who were committed to a world blessed with justice, compassion, security and welfare while making sure not a drop of blood was shed unjustly to achieve this.

It is unfortunate that many in the world ignore these ties and choose violence over peace, extremism over moderation and ignorance over dialogue and understanding. I hope this day will serve as a turning point for the recent disintegration of peace and understanding, and that the day of Ashura will act as a reminder to us all of the bonds of compassion our great traditions have imbued upon us.

Mohamed H. Sabur is co-director of the Qunoot Foundation and a University alumnus. Please send comments to letters@mndaily.com.

CAIR Fellowship to Focus on Diversity in Muslim Community

2006-02-01T00:00:00.000-05:00

(Link: http://www.cair-net.org/default.asp?Page=articleView&id=1974&theType=NR)

First-time award will assist research in field of intra-community outreach

(WASHINGTON, D.C., 2/1/06) - A prominent national Islamic civil rights and advocacy group today announced a joint fellowship designed to help increase appreciation for and understanding of the diversity within the American Muslim community.

The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) is partnering with the Washington-based Qunoot Foundation to offer a fellowship position at CAIR's Capitol Hill headquarters during the summer of 2006.

"We are pleased to be working with the Qunoot Foundation to explore issues relating to underrepresented and misunderstood segments of the American Muslim community," said CAIR Executive Director Nihad Awad.

"The establishment of this fellowship provides a big step towards increasing tolerance and understanding within the American Muslim community,” said Qunoot Foundation Co-Director Mohamed Sabur. “We must continue to celebrate those ties that bind us together as Muslims while cherishing our differences," said Sabur, a former CAIR intern.
The CAIR/Qunoot Foundation "Diversity and Intra-Community Outreach Fellowship" will be open to students who have shown commitment to the promotion of mutual understanding as well as those with experience in statistical and ethnographic research.

CAIR, America's largest Muslim civil liberties group, has 31 offices and chapters nationwide and in Canada. Its mission is to enhance the understanding of Islam, encourage dialogue, protect civil liberties, empower American Muslims, and build coalitions that promote justice and mutual understanding.

The Qunoot Foundation is a Washington-based community education organization that seeks to provide a platform for Muslim youth to articulate their political, ideological, socioeconomic, ethnic, and gender-related perspectives on both the Shia community and the Muslim community at large.

CONTACT: Ibrahim Hooper, 202-488-8787 or 202-744-7726, E-Mail: ihooper@cair-net.org; Rabiah Ahmed, 202-488-8787 or 202-439-1441, E-Mail: rahmed@cair-net.org; Mohamed H. Sabur, 763-442-4045, E-Mail: mohamed@qunoot.org; Zahir Janmohamed, 202-368-8914, E-Mail: zahir@qunoot.org

Look For Comedy Elsewhere - alt.muslim

2006-01-20T12:00:00.000-05:00

(Link: http://www.altmuslim.com/perm.php?id=1632_0_25_0_C38)

As offensive and racist as Brooks' humor often is, the most offensive part of his film is that it fails to deliver what it searches for: comedy.

By Zahir Janmohamed, January 20, 2006

Watching Albert Brooks in "Looking for Comedy in the Muslim World" is a bit like watching William Hung of American Idol sing: we want to root for him because of his sincerity and his effort, but, like Hung, his talent is no match for the material he tackles.

In the press packet for the film, Brooks says that "If an Indian audience or a Muslim audience could laugh because we're making fun of ourselves a little bit it certainly couldn't hurt."

But the joke is not just on him or Americans but also on (and at the expense) of South Asians and Muslims who are portrayed as primitive bellicose buffoons. The premise is that the US State Department wants to understand what makes Muslims laugh. Brooks is then dispatched (with two State Department minders) to India to complete his research.

After accepting the position, we see Brooks complaining about flying coach class and later about having to take a taxi instead of a government car. I imagine Brooks penned this as a commentary on the US government's frequent failure to equip its people with proper resources, as we see in Iraq with the US troops. Brooks exploits the humor out of this and as a result all of his dialogue seems to end with a question mark: "You mean there are no comedy clubs in Delhi?" "You mean I am supposed to work in this office?" "You mean...?"

It would have been funnier (and more accurate) if Brooks had done a send-up on how State Department officials really travel - in business class and in protected bullet proof convoys with minders who urge staff members not to talk with locals for any reason. Want to buy a salwar khameez outfit in the Lahore bazaar? A State Department assistant will bring the shop to you. The humor is not that American officials and representatives are clueless ó it is that this administration's policy often promotes a culture of isolation and fear of locals.

Brooks eventually hires a Hindu assistant named Maya (played with a lousy Indian accent by Sheetal Sheth). But before settling on her, Brooks interviews a litany of candidates, including a hijab wearing woman who is obsessed to know if Brooks is Jewish. In another scene, Brooks says "I can't be dealing with Middle Easterns (sic) who will be bury me and throw stones on me." His assistant interjects, "No, thats only in Libya."

It's this sort of "nudge nudge wink wink" humor that Brooks relies too heavily upon in his film. When he is setting up his comedy show, he requests a changing room. When denied, he says, "What, do you not have a changing room? Am I supposed to change on stage?" A Sikh man nods his head. When Brooks is finally given his dressing room, its a teepee style tent outside the theater. "Don't you guys have bathrooms at least?"

In another scene, Maya's Iranian boyfriend (who speaks oddly with a mixed Russian and New Jersey accent) says, "I was the funniest person in explosives camp." I did not know whether to cringe at that line because of its blatant stereotyping or because of its awful writing.

That audiences would find this funny (as they did in the press screening I attended) is partly a reflection of how acceptable it has become to make jokes about Muslims or South Asians. (It is also, I suppose, a reflection of the degradation of films in America where comedians like Brooks can still elicit laughter and critical praise.)

The film hits a low when Brooks travels (illegally) to Pakistan for a comedy show near the border. Brooks performs at a camp-fire gathering of Muslim men who look like they have each done time in a cave in Tora Bora. The group is guarded by bodyguard because we are led to believe that comedy like that is simply too dangerous in Pakistan. Brooks casts himself as a vanguard figure who breaks through (literally and figuratively) to deliver comedy to the starved Muslim people. His character reminded me of Harrison Ford in "The Mosquito Coast" who goes to South America to give people ice because it will change their lives.

Indeed, Brooks should be applauded for his insistence on keeping the word "Muslim" in the film title. But the panache by which Brooks has presented himself as a trailblazer in making this film is troubling. Brooks comedy is nothing new, despite its admittedly clever title. His comedy is part of a long (and expanding) list of Hollywood movies that uses Muslims, South Asians, and Arabs either as a punchline or a villain.

I imagine that studio heads will gather on Monday morning to assess why the film failed at the box office. Perhaps Sony was right, a studio head may offer, and the word Muslim did in fact draw audiences away. But this could not be father from the truth.

As offensive and racist as Brooks' humor often is, the most offensive part of his film is that it fails to deliver what it searches for: comedy.

Zahir Janmohamed, co-director of The Qunoot Foundation, wants 98 minutes of his life back. Read more of his writings at www.falloficarus.blogspot.com

MPAC Announces Fellowship for Outreach to Shi'a Community

2005-12-12T00:00:00.000-05:00

(Link: http://www.mpac.org/home_article_display.aspx?ITEM=853)

The Muslim Public Affairs Council is pleased to announce a joint fellowship with The Qunoot Foundation for outreach to and research on the Shi'a Muslim community in the United States. The fellowship provides funding for one intern in MPAC's Washington DC office in summer 2006 to focus on concerns within the Shi'a community.

Washington, DC - The Qunoot Foundation is a Washington DC-based not-for-profit organization that focuses on socio-political education within the Shi'a Muslim community.

The fellowship is open to all candidates -- regardless of religious persuasion -- who show a demonstrated interest in working to bridge relations between Muslims in the US. More information about the program will be available soon on MPAC's website.

Zahir Janmohamed, co-founder of The Qunoot Foundation and a speaker at MPAC's upcoming 5th annual convention said, "We believe MPAC is doing some of the finest work in embracing the diversity within Islam and we are honored to establish this relationship."

[CONTACT: Edina Lekovic, 213-383-3443, communications@mpac.org]

Letter to the Editor - Minnesota Daily

2005-12-09T00:00:00.000-05:00

Stereotyping of Muslims
Link: http://www.mndaily.com/articles/2005/12/09/66536

In response to Adam Elrashidi’s Wednesday editorial cartoon, I thought it necessary to point out that the stereotyping of Arabs and Muslims is nothing new on TV and the big screen. Long before the horrendous attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, these people have been vilified in Hollywood blockbusters such as 1994’s “True Lies” and 1998’s “The Siege.”

However, what tells of a troubling shift, is that these stereotypes are no longer of the West’s view of a prototype Muslim: a brown-skinned male, aged 18-35, with a beard and Arabic accent. As we have witnessed over the past few months on Fox’s “24” and Showtime’s “Sleeper Cell” (which debuted just this past Sunday), is that now all Muslims are being targeted, not just Arabs. These shows, although politically corrected with public service announcements and lines by Muslim characters such as “These [terrorists] have nothing to do with my faith,” continue to try and convince the viewer that their friendly Muslim neighbor, regardless of race, color or ethnicity, may be a sleeper agent waiting to be activated. In stark opposition to our government’s claims that the War on Terror is not a war against Islam, our media’s portrayal of our newest enemy tells us otherwise.

These continual depictions of everyday Muslims as terrorists belies the true nature of our country’s more than 6 million American Muslims, and does an injustice to all who believe in true and just characterization of vulnerable communities through whatever form of media.

Mohamed H. Sabur
University alumnus
co-founder of The Qunoot Foundation

Response to Sunnipath.com

2005-12-08T12:37:00.000-05:00

At dinner the other night, I mentioned to my friend Svend about www.sunnipath.com (hereafter SP) degradation of Shias. On SP's website, Shaikh Faraz Rabbani claims that "Shi`ite methodology in hadith is laughably weak and self-contradictory."

(btw Svend moderated one of the sessions at our recent The Qunoot Foundation conference and he has been very supportive of our efforts to highlights concerns of the Shia community)

There are numerous examples of anti-Shia rhetoric on the internet but SP is quite a different story. They should be taken serious because they have growing legitimacy within Sunni circles as a source on Hanafi/Shafi fiqh. Whats interesting is the Sufi bent of SP. I say interesting because while SP will rightfully defend the importance of Sufism within Islam, the website makes numerous, offensive remarks about Shias. It is one thing to have theological differences and to even believe that the "other" may not lay claim to the "correct" understanding. But it is another thing to mock and I have often found SP to belong to this latter category.

Often our perception of proponents of Sufis is rather hagiographical but I found that in many cases, some of the most ardent opponents of Shias are self-described Sufis. The example of Nuh Ha Mim Keller comes to mind. (For more on Keller's insulting comments about Shias, check out this site here)

I say self-described Sufis because the transformation of Sufism is a subject worth exploring. As my dear professor Dr. Algar used to say in class all the time, "Sufism was once a reality without a name. Now it is a name without a reality."

While I have slight disagreements with Svend's analysis below, I admire his comments below for his polite etiquette and respect for SP. Thats important, especially if we want to talk to--not at--Sunni Path. Because SP has warned its readers to stay clear of Shias (literally not just spiritually), I am not sure what recourse Shias have to speak with SP. Thats all the more reason why I think Svend's comments are so important. (Note: Last week, his wife Shabana Mir posted a critique on her blog of Sunni Path's dismissal of Tariq Ramadan. Its a great read and it can be found here)

Please feel free to pass this around. If you have comments, please post them to the comments section of Svend's blog: http://www.akramsrazor.typepad.com/

Looking ahead, these are some of the projects that I hope The Qunoot Foundation can sponsor, publish, and disseminate--if funds permit--hint hint =)

I have always maintained that "ignorance" is too simplistic an explanation for this degradation and that in many cases, certain ideas, teachings (and indeed teachers) must be challenged.

I really admire him for writing this and articulating an alternative perspective. Visit Svend's site and give him the props he deserves.

***
Tearing down Shiahs

Speaking of SunniPath, we happened to have dinner with a Shiah friend and his wife last night and I was shown some statements posted on there concerning the Shiah tradition that really saddened me.

While I don't always agree with SP, I've always been impressed by the profundity and knowledge of its contributors, and can only pray that I one day attain a fraction of their erudition and insight. So I was quite surprised when I saw a posting that included the following comments:

"...the Shi`a are considered Muslims who are people of innovation (ahl al-bid`a)..."
"The sunna with the people of innovation [i.e., Shiahs] is to avoid keeping their company"
"Their transmissions [that support differences in how Shiah Muslims pray] from Ahl al-Bayt are fabricated. [...] Shi`ite methodology in hadith is laughably weak and self-contradictory.".

Now, I concede that I'm not a scholar who's able to evaluate the substance of these disputes and therefore accept the guidance of those who are. I also believe in honestly acknowledging differences of opinion rather than papering them over for the sake of some nebulous sense of unity (in practice, that kind of "unity" often succeeds in denying others a voice rather than bringing people together), so I'm not at all against Sunnis and Shiahs debating the issues that divide them.

But it seems to me that one can pick a side while acknowledging that there is another side--that there are competing conceptions of Islam--and without needlessly denigrating that other side. After all, the Muslims are instructed in the Quran to refrain from even mocking the gods of idolators:

Revile not ye those whom they call upon besides Allah, lest they out of spite revile Allah in their ignorance. Thus have We made alluring to each people its own doings. In the end will they return to their Lord, and We shall then tell them the truth of all that they did. (6:108)

Even if the evidence is overwhelmingly for the Sunni view, I am surprised by how some Sunni Muslim scholars feel justified in speaking so dismissively of Shiah tradition and practice. I don't understand it from a factual perspective. If one accepts, as I do, the Sunni stand, does it follow that Shiah scholars' evidence is "laughably weak and self-contradictory"? (The subtext to such a sweeping declaration is that the whole Shiah scholarly establishment is intellectually, if not morally, bankrupt. That's pretty problematic, and only a hair's breadth away from demonization and takfir.) Can't Shiahs and Sunnis honestly disagree over the historical evidence? Don't Shiahs have serious counterarguments (e.g., as this article notes, among other things, there is an ayat in the Quran that could be interpreted to support the practice of maatam) that need to be acknowledged and reviewed before coming to such a drastic conclusion?

Were we living in the Abbasid era--when Sunnis and Shiahs were vieing for control of the Ummah--perhaps there'd be a pragmatic argument for taking the low road, trashing your opponents to win the debate on the "street", where scholarly arguments hold less sway than appeals to pride and passion. But do we live in such a time today?

I mean no disrespect to Shiahs when I say this, but I don't think there's any danger of Al-Azhar being eclipsed by Qom anytime soon, at least not in terms of power and influence within the Muslim world. Sunni scholars' hold on the reins of Islamic orthodoxy in the eyes of most of the world is assured by the much larger number of Sunnis than Shiahs.

Also, so far as I know there isn't a significant trend of Sunnis "converting" [sic] to Shiah interpretations. Sunnis aren't struggling to hold their own against Shiah missionaries (as was the case in Muslim India a century ago, when Christian and Hindu missionaries were converting Muslims) .

The borders of these communities are more or less fixed by geography, demographics, and family history, so they're not really competing.

Given those realities, one would expect the analysis from the Sunni side to be temperate and dignified--in a certain sense, it is coming from a position of strength--but the opposite too often seems to be the case (and, it should be noted, is sometimes seen on the Shiah side, as well).

And you'd think we'd have bigger fish to fry than warning Sunnis to avoid hanging out with Shiahs. Given all the social problems we have in Muslim communities, I'm not sure a typical Sunni's top priority needs to be avoiding the company of a Shiah. There's no shortage of fellow Sunnis whose company one probably ought to avoid, to say nothing of how elastic this simple category of "Sunni" is for these purposes in an era of rampant secularism and religious experimentation. One wishes that such statements were contextualized more (e.g., are they referring to hardline Shiahs who vilify highly regarded Sahaba, or all Shiahs regardless of their actions or piety).

Then there's the eerily familiar ring this kind of talk has. There's a certain irony to Sufi scholars making categorical declarations that deny any intellectual legitimacy or dignity to Shiah beliefs, given how they were until quite recently on the receiving end of this phenonmenon at the hands of Wahhabis in many places. The confidence with which these declarations about the self-evident illegitimacy of maatam reminds me of the way all these vowel-heavy websites (i.e., those that assault native English speakers' aesthetic sense by insisting on using unsightly transliterations such as "Islaam", "Qur'aan", ...) discuss tawassul (e.g., this rant on http://www.allaahuakbar.net). For decades, Wahhabis (and the Wahhabized) defined Sufis and just about everybody else as outside the Ahl Sunnah wa Jama'at, and now that the tide is turning and Sufis are regaining their rightful voice within the community, some are taking a page from the Wahhabis and labeling Shiahs as being Ahl Bida etc. It seems like some us nodded off during class and missed the most important lesson of all.

Again, for me the point isn't that we should become relativists who shy away from open debate, but that we should engage in such discussions with a sense of mutual respect and an awareness that there are competing paradigms (even when we think the evidence is clearly on our side). Also, nuances in the other side's beliefs and practices need to be acknowledged (e.g., Sunni polemicists tend talk as if all Shiahs maim themselves, when the truth is that maatam takes many different forms with varying degrees of intensity and physicality).

I make these comments not to attack anybody--not that a critique from a lay person like me is terribly important in the grand scheme of things, anyway--but because I think that public statements denigrating a whole Muslim community need to be publicly challenged within the larger Muslim community because of the harm they do to us all. There are real world consequences to such offhand statements--including loss of life--in some parts of the Muslim world (e.g., Pakistan, Iraq) where Sunnis and Sunnis clash needlessly.

Finally, as a Muslim and a Sunni, I want these issues to be discussed seriously and in a way that results in increased clarity and understanding for Sunni and Shiah alike. I think a respectful and objective analysis would be far more effective towards this end. It would ultimately be more convincing, as well, I believe.

Allahu a`lam.

TQF in the Washington Post

2005-11-20T00:00:00.000-05:00

Shiite Muslims in U.S. Stay Silent on Problems

Link: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/18/AR2005111802427_2.html

A new survey shows that Shiite Muslims in the United States are unlikely to report anti-Muslim hate crimes or other forms of discrimination.

Nearly 80 percent of American Shiites who were victims of "post 9-11 discrimination" reported the incidents either to family members or no one, according to the nationwide survey. The survey was sponsored by the Qunoot Foundation, a Washington-based nonprofit group that released its findings Nov. 12 at a conference.

The survey found that few American Shiite victims reported such incidents to the Council on American-Islamic Relations, a national advocacy group that seeks to represent all American Muslims.

While there are an estimated 6 million Muslims in the United States, no one knows how many of them are Shiite. Worldwide, Shiites account for 10 percent to 15 percent of the Muslim population.

The survey also reported that 47 percent of American Shiites said they experienced overt or subtle forms of discrimination when attending Sunni-dominated mosques.

Conference participants -- mostly American Shiites in their twenties and thirties -- debated vigorously about whether to form their own national advocacy organizations or to try to make existing, Sunni-dominated ones, such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations, more responsive to their needs.

-- Religion News Service

An Unequal Silence

2005-11-18T15:35:00.000-05:00

According to the BBC, two suicide bombers have left 80 dead and injured 100. The article notes:

The suicide bombs in Khanaqin, in north-eastern Iraq, are the latest in a string of attacks against Shia mosques.

The BBC's Jim Muir, in Baghdad, says the attacks were intended as an act of sectarian provocation, as all the casualties must have been Shia Muslims at prayer.

The BBC has an interesting sidebar that documents the “bloodiest” days in Iraq:

18 Nov 2005 - 80 dead
Multiple bombings in Baghdad and two Khanaqin mosques

14 Sept 2005 - 182 dead
Suicide car bomber targets Baghdad labourers in worst of a series of bombs

16 Aug 2005 - 90 dead
Suicide bomber detonates fuel tanker in Musayyib

28 Feb 2005 - 114 dead
Suicide car bomb hits government jobseekers in Hilla

24 June 2004 - 100 dead
Co-ordinated blasts in Mosul and four other cities

2 March 2004 - 140 dead
Suicide bombers attack Shia festival-goers in Karbala and Baghdad

1 Feb 2004 - 105 dead
Twin attacks on Kurdish parties' offices in Irbil

28 Aug 2003 - 85 dead
Car bomb at Najaf shrine kills Shia cleric Muhammad Baqr Hakim and many others

That’s a total causality amount of 896. Of the eight events listed above, five were direct attacks on Shias, resulting in 692 of total causalities (77.2%).

Last week’s tragic attack in Amman which claimed my friend’s uncle, Mustafa Al-Akkad, claimed 50 lives. It was met with international condemnation.

To my knowledge, no major group has condemned—or even addressed—this most recent attack in Baghdad.

TQF on EthicsDaily.com

2005-11-18T00:00:00.000-05:00

Survey: American Shiite Muslims Unlikely to Report Discrimination
Link: http://ethicsdaily.com/article_detail.cfm?AID=6583
Andrea Useem
11-18-05

(RNS) A new survey shows American Shiites are unlikely to report anti-Muslim hate crimes or other forms of discrimination and many say they face religious hostility when attending Sunni-dominated mosques in the United States.
Nearly 80 percent of American Shiites who were victims of "post 9-11 discrimination" reported the incidents either to family members or no one, according to the nationwide survey, the first of its kind to document the political and religious experiences of American Shiites.

The American Shi'a Muslim Survey was sponsored by the Qunoot Foundation, a Washington-based nonprofit that released its findings Saturday at a conference.

The survey found that few American Shiite victims reported such incidents to the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), a national advocacy group that seeks to represent all American Muslims.

Last year, CAIR processed nearly 1,700 reported cases of anti-Muslim discrimination or hate crimes, according to its 2005 annual report. The council does not keep track of whether victims are Sunni or Shiite, said Rabiah Ahmed, a spokeswoman for the organization.

While there are an estimated 6 million Muslims in the United States, nobody knows what percent of that total is Shiite. Worldwide, Shiites comprise between 10 percent and 15 percent of the total Muslim population with some tension arising over the fact that Saudi Arabia regards Shiite theology and practice as heresy.

The survey also showed that 47 percent of American Shiites experienced either overt or subtle forms of discrimination when attending Sunni mosques.

Conference participants--mostly American Shiites in their 20s and 30s--debated vigorously about whether to form their own national advocacy organizations or to seek to make existing, Sunni-dominated ones, such as CAIR, more responsive to American Shiite needs.

One reason the issue has come to the forefront is the sectarian nature of the Iraq war, said Najam Haider, a Princeton doctoral student who spoke at the conference.
"We are perceived as the ‘good Muslims' now, and many say we should use that to our advantage," said Haider, referring to the cooperation between Iraqi Shiites and the Bush administration.

The Rosa Parks of Pakistan?

2005-11-04T17:52:00.000-05:00

Not quite. Thats not to say that Mukhtaran Bibi does not have the same courage or elegant composure that Parks had. But the circumstances --and more importantly the causes -- that produced Rosa Parks and Mukatarn are incongruent.

That did not, however, stop audience members on Monday night in DC from asking her if she felt she was Pakistan's Rosa Parks. Never mind that the question assumes a knowledge of American civil rights icons in rural Pakistan. The question reveals the (sub?)conscious effort to place historical figures in imaginary boxes.

I--like so many others in the audience--was humbled by her humbleness. What impressed me about her, aside from her brave struggle, is her sincerity and her incredible political acumen. When asked by NPR what she would tell Congress in her testimony the following day, she said she would think about it and then tell them tomorrow.

In a town that thrives and sustains on BS and self-aggrandizement, its refreshing to see voices like Mai illuminating our path.

To support her, check out a cool effort by some Muslims called (of course) Muslims for Muktaran.

Things That Make You Go "Hmmm...."

2005-10-31T23:15:00.000-05:00

I asked my good friend Fatema to comment about Ahmadinejad comments about Israel and her comments are below.

I have always been impressed by Fatema's ability to process a multitude of sources and develop a coherent outlook on complex events.
***
On October 27th, at a conference entitled The World without Zionism, Iranian president Ahmadinejad stated that Israel should be "wiped off the map." His statement is not surprising. In fact, it probably resonates with how many people feel due to Israel's continued atrocities & injustice towards the Palestinians & violation of international law.

How do I feel about it? I think it's an inappropriate remark on many levels:

1. It's immoral: Israel is not a non-living entity. It is a country that consists of innocent people who did not choose to be born there and now find themselves embrolied in a decades-old conflict just like the Palestinians. It is like saying “Death to Israel” and does not really make sense. Muslims don’t like to be regarded as “terrorists” due to the actions of a few extremist Muslims, and I think it is unfair to judge all Jews and Israelis based on the actions of a few political and religious leaders.

2. It's a bad political move: this statement is the last thing that Iranian administration needed when President Ahmadinejad is already facing international pressure about its uranium enrichment program. Secondly, it doesn't help Muslims and Arabs in the West who are trying to portray Islam in a positive light and working to live a normal life; nor does it help activists working on Muslim or Middle Eastern issues because they may now be required to respond or explain the Iranian president’s remark.

3. It's not pragmatic: I can understand if people don’t support the Zionist ideology or the initial creation of Israel. However, the country was established more than 50 years ago and it is apparent that it is not going away. Therefore, we need to accept this fact & move on. Instead of looking back, our efforts must be focused sincerely on the future of the Palestinians and creating a situation that provides them with a normal life sans the oppression they have suffered for so many decades.

This piece from a BBC article captured how I feel about the issue:

"What we need to be talking about is adding the state of Palestine to the map and not wiping Israel from the map," he said. (Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erekat).

"In principle, we are way beyond this type of political rhetoric that shows the weakness of the Iranian government," said an official at the Egyptian embassy in London.

Iranian Blogger Jailed

2005-10-31T11:13:00.000-05:00

Again from Iranian Truth

Nema highlights an unfortunate violation of freedom of expression in Iran where incidents like this are, sadly, common.

***
This from Shahram Kholdi:

Seyyed Ahmad Seyyed Seraji [a Iranian blogger] has lost his appeal and is now to serve 18 months of jail (and receive 30 lashes), on charges of attempting to overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran and insulting the Supreme Leader…He was arrested in June 2005 on the charge of anti-regime propaganda activities (through the weblogs that he managed). The arrest took place pursuant to another arrest that had taken place two years earlier on charges of activities against the security of the state. Though the Revolutionary Court (Branch Three of Tabriz) exonerated him of the charge of blasphemy, he was convicted to six months imprisonment as well as thirty lashes for insulting the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. In total, now Seyyed Seraji will have to serve eighteen months as he was earlier convicted to twelve months by another Court of First Instance.

In none of the stages of the proceedings, according to Payman Pakmehr (the director of Tabriz News Agency), Seyyed Seraji was represented by a lawyer, and apparently he was several times assaulted in prison since June. Pakmehr also reports that this is not the end of the proceeding as the respective sentences are pending an appeal hearing at one of the branches of the State Supreme Court in Tehran.

Shia Teacher Killed in Quetta

2005-10-29T12:31:00.000-04:00

A Shia teacher and zakir, Murid Abbas, was killed on his way to school on Wednesday in Quetta. The police deemed it an act of sectarian violence.

More than 100 people have died in similar violence over the past two years, according to the Daily Times.

I asked a friend to comment on the attack and he agreed to do so on condition of annonymity. His comments are below:

•••

The most recent killing of a member of Pakistan's Shiite community highlights the prevailing trend of contradictions in State policy. On the one hand, the State has tried to distance itself from religious extremism and its resulting fallout of persecution of minorities comprised of religious groups and sects. On the other hand, it is under no illusion to the fact that its undemocratic hold on power and relevant institutions can only be supported by these religious groups.

Hence, it would rather tolerate the fallout that such a marriage entails than take concrete steps to allay the concerns of those who are likely to be the murder victims of such a marriage. While the violence against Shias in the urban centers of Pakistan such as Lahore and Karachi is mostly sporadic, there is a low intensity campaign in the Northern Areas of Pakistan such as Gilgit to permanently crush and cripple the Shia minority there.

Quetta presents even an even more starker picture. Despite being an urban center, its proximity to the troubled Northern Areas and Waziristan entails that support for Deobandi-Wahabi extremist militias runs high. Just last year, there was the famous incident of Khawar Mehdi, a minder for two French journalist who was "detained" by the State and tortured. His fault was that he guided the French journalists in breaking the story that Quetta was still a Taliban stronghold years after Pakistan had officially jettisoned its policy of "strategic depth".

Quetta also has a signinficant presence of Shia Hazaras; a minority that has suffered horrifically under Taliban rule in Afghanistan and where they were the victims of periodic pogroms and mini-genocides (the most significant of which was the mass rape and slaughter of Hazara minorities during the 1998 takeover of Mazar-e-Sharif by the Taliban). It must also be noted that the destruction of the Bamiyan statues by the Taliban in 2001 was undertaken not simply to satisfy their puritanical creed but also to cripple Hazara consciousness; the latter of whom had been guarding and preserving these World Heritage sites under the pluralistic ethos of Shiaism.

The last two and half years have seen the Hazaras of Quetta as the worst victims of Wahabi terrorism in Pakistan. Similarly, the educated and more liberal Pushtun Shias in Quetta have also been the target of vicious attacks and suffered heavy casualties. The State prefers minimal action and has back tracked on every initiative that would curb the menace of extremist militias and hooligans. It has failed to reform madrasses, given too many concessions to extremist groups towards madrassa registration and it has failed utterly to amend or better yet, revoke the Blasphemy Law. These are the Beta Noir of Pakistan's Wahabi-Deobandi nexus. The Military-Mullah alliance is alive and kicking...

Response to Tariq Ali

2005-10-28T12:54:00.000-04:00

"The Shia [...] have little to do with Islamic theology." So writes Tariq Ali in his review of Reza Aslan's book, No God but God.

I interviewed Reza for my 11th podcast which can be heard here.

I found Ali's review to be both inaccurate and distasteful. Below is the response that I sent to both the Guardian and Reza:

***
Dear Editor,

Tariq Ali's review of Reza Aslan's book "No God But God" ironically lacks the nuanced approach that Ali praises about Aslan's debut book. Ali's criticism of Aslan's understanding of early Islam--particularly of the rise of Shiism---is based on inaccurate and offensive claims.

It is inaccurate because Ali recycles the myth that the heirs to the Fourth Caliph Ali were "weak-willed and easily manipulated." This ignores the historical fact that the Imams of Shiite Islam were fiercely persecuted by Sunni Caliphs from the Ummayad and the Abbasid dynasties. Despite this opposition, they refused to rubber-stamp the political order of their time. The eighth Imam from the Shiite household, for example, refused political authority because he did not want to be co opted by the corrupt and brutal caliph at the time, Haroon Al-Rashid.

It is offensive because of Ali's assertion that "Shia sects..have little to do with Islamic theology." This gross denouncement of nearly 15% of the Muslim world is more typical from the mouths of extremist Wahhabis who are all too eager to caste Shias as unbelivers. It is odd--and discomforting--coming from an intellectual like Ali.

Aslan's book provides a lucid and fresh survey on Islamic history, one that looks at the initial schism between Sunni and Shia not as a contestation of who would rule the Muslim community but as how the Muslim community would be governed.

Perhaps Ali, who has repeatedly described Shia Muslims with condescension, is more close to the "bearded moderates" that it would appear.

Zahir Janmohamed
Janmohamed is Co-Director of the Washington DC based Qunoot Foundation, a non-profit organization that seeks to empower Muslim youth.
zahir@qunoot.org

How "Islamo-fascism" is the pretext for Islamic discrimination

2005-10-24T16:57:00.000-04:00

The entry below is from Nema Milaninia, author of the blog Iranian Truth

His entries provide a much needed critical analysis of current events within Iran. I am always impressed by Nema's ability to uncover news items that few news outlets pick up or grant significant space and/or attention.

His entry below is about Bush's recent speech about his crusade against terrorism.

***
What I find disturbing about Bush's latest classification of this "war" following 9/11 are the implicit statements underlying its evolution. As we all know following 9/11 the Bush administration announced a “Global War on Terror.” Very recently, the war on terror changed to the “global struggle against violent extremism.” In Bush’s latest speech justifying the war on Iraq and the war post-9/11 he used a different brand name. One more poignant to nomenclature used by his supporters. He said we are now in a war against “Islamo-fascism.” While Bush did note that “Islamo-fascism” is different then Islam itself, I think the very act of narrowing down terrorism to one religion or faith serves as a basis of declaring that religion or faith as a cause for terrorism. Thus, as has always been with this president, his implicit rationale trumps his explicit statements.

The first two brand names for the war are classified in generally neutral terms in the sense that it doesn't point to any particular religion, or faith. By using neutral terms terrorism and extremism is not considered the product of any one particular faith, but a global issue that can emerge from a person of any spiritual or religious background. Note, however, that conservative circles and pundits, as well as many self-proclaimed liberals, collapse the notion of "terror" and "extremism" with "Islam" while completely disregarding the prevalence of terrorism and extremism committed by non-Muslims, particularly prior to the Iraqi war. In fact, to signify the combinative effect of these elements the term “Islamo-fascism” has become the preferred nomenclature.

The consequences of these distortions have already rooted themselves out in many conservative circles. Robert Spencer, the right wing director of "Jihad Watch" has already noted that by collapsing these notions Bush will enable "officials to pursue jihadists in America more openly than they have up to now" and to "call on groups such as the Council on American Islamic Relations and the Muslim Public Affairs Council to renounce all intention to bring Sha’ria to the United States even by peaceful means.” Essentially Spencer is saying that by fighting a war against “Islamo-fascism,” America can further suppress the rights of free speech and association of Muslims, regardless of whether there is intent to foster extremism. Daniel Pipes broadens the notion of "Islamo-fascism" by including Muslims who wish to politicize their faith. Under Pipes understanding of "Islamo-fascism", we should go to war Iraq's current government given the insistence of its leaders and people to use the Qu'ran as a source of law and legislation.

By identifying any war with any faith Bush makes the misguided and dangerous move of association. Bush’s new classification does not make the enemy any more clearer, it makes confuses and conflates the notions of Islam and fascism together. It makes the superficial claim that terrorism is rooted in one religion, rather then looking at social and political issue that transcend across all acts of terrorism.

Response to Juan Cole

2005-10-17T11:14:00.000-04:00

I am a big fan of Juan Cole's blog but there are times where I question some of his assessment. I asked Najam Haider, doctoral student at Princeton in Islamic studies, to respond to one of Juan Cole's entry for our qunoot blog. His entry is below.

ps: if you want to submit something for the blog, please email: info@qunoot.org

***
Juan Cole can usually be counted on to offer an intelligent analysis of world events on his popular blog aptly entitled ‘Informed Comment.’

This is hardly a surprise as Professor Cole is an established Professor of History at the University of Michigan with an impressive array of scholarly achievement characterized by a deep understanding of the Middle East and, in particular, Shi‘i communities. Bearing this in mind, I was deeply disappointed to wake up this morning to a rather confused blog on the recently released letter allegedly written by Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi.

Specifically, Prof. Cole says:

My gut tells me that the letter is a forgery. Most likely it is a black psy-ops operation of the US. But it could also come from Iran, since the mistakes are those a Shiite might make when pretending to be a Sunni.

Now this is a quite a claim and we should expect an authority of Prof. Cole’s stature to provide rock solid evidence. In fact, what he argues is that the terminology in the letter would never be used by a Sunni since it accords the Family of the Prophet an exalted status. He states:

Adding to the salutation "the peace and blessings of God be upon him [Muhammad]" the phrase "and his family" would be an insult to Zarqawi and to the hardline Sunnis in Iraq.

While it is true that Shi‘ism emphasizes the almost exclusive authority of the Family, this argument utterly fails to comprehend the Sunni position (both traditional and Salafi). In particular, every Sunni polemicist from the 3^rd/9^th C has emphasized the particular significance of the Prophet’s family side by side with the Companions. Sunni (and especially Salafi) scholars repeatedly criticize the Shi‘a not for their love of the Prophet’s family but for their dismissal of the Companions.

Prof. Cole’s assertion that the phrase, “Peace and Blessing be upon the Messenger of God and his family and his companions,” is a Shi‘i attempt to be Sunni would come as a shock to Sunni prayer leaders throughout Syria, Turkey, and Morocco (to name just those countries where I have witnessed it directly) that invoke the exact phrase in their Friday sermons. The fact that Prof. Cole “never, ever heard a Sunni Muslim add ‘wa alihi’ (his family) to the salutation” is utterly incomprehensible coming from a scholar of his standing.

Prof. Cole’s statement that a Sunni would never refer to Husayn, the grandson of the Prophet, “as al-Imam al-sibt” (the Imam, the grandson) is equally puzzling as the terminology is found in a wide array of classical historical sources dating back to the medieval period. Any visitor to Istanbul would be hard pressed to not notice the exact phrase enshrined in all the Grand Mosques where both grandson’s of the Prophet are accorded equal standing with the first four Caliphs. The argument is again indicative of a fundamental misunderstanding of the Sunni conception of the Prophet’s family.

All of this aside (and it constitutes the entirety of Prof. Coles’ substantive argument), Coles concludes with the claim that:

I do not believe that an Egyptian like al-Zawahiri would use this phraseology at all. But he certainly would not use it to open a letter to a Salafi. Sunni hardliners deeply object to what they see as Shiite idolatry of the imams or descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, for whom they made shrines such as Ali's at Najaf and Husayn's at Karbala. In fact, hard line Wahhabis from Saudi Arabia attacked and sacked Karbala in 1803.

The crux of the argument is reduced to a rather far-fetched logical inference. Specifically, Prof. Cole takes Sunni-Salafi opposition to visiting tombs (deemed idolatry) and extends it to encompass an opposition to respecting the Prophet’s family in a simple invocation!

In truth, there are problems associated with asserting the authenticity of the letter. Prof. Cole is write is ascertaining the lack of a personal relationship between Zawahiri and Zarqawi. He writes:

The letter then says how much Zawahiri misses meeting with Zarqawi. Zarqawi was not part of al-Qaeda when he was in Afghanistan. He had a rivalry with it.

Prof. Cole apparently missed the line at the end of the letter when Zawahiri writes, “If by chance you’re going to Fallujah, send greetings to Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi” which would have satisfied much of his unease. At least one academic confided to me that the letter was clearly not intended for Zarqawi at all but rather for Abu Mus`ab al-Suri from whom it was seized by the US Armed Forces.

This post is not intended to disparage Prof. Cole as he remains one of the most intelligent and insightful commentators on events pertaining to the Middle East. I harbor an immense respect for him as a scholar and an analyst. In this case, however, he is clearly wrong. This letter (if it is in fact authentic) is as much a product of Shi‘i machinations as the epistles of Ahmad b. Hanbal (who uses the greetings Prof. Cole finds so puzzling) or the Ottoman constructed Blue Mosque in Istanbul.

Fear Of A Shia Crescent: Dr. Abdulaziz Sachedina on Iran & Iraq - alt.muslim

2005-10-12T12:00:00.000-04:00

(Link: http://www.altmuslim.com/perm.php?id=1565_0_25_0_C38)

Dr. Abdulaziz Sachedina talks to alt.muslim about sectarianism in Iraq, political maturation in Iran, and the prospects of stability in both countries.

By Zahir Janmohamed, October 12, 2005

These are turbulent times for both Iran and Iraq, with both internal and external forces vying to shape the future of both countries. What challenges and opportunities lie ahead for both countries? How will human rights and the will of the people fare in the coming years? alt.muslim's Zahir Janmohamed interviewed Dr. Abdulaziz Sachedina, who is a Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Virginia. He is currently on a one-year Sabbatical in Iran, where he is teaching in the Department of Theology and Islamic Studies at the Ferdowsi University of Mashhad. He has most recently been active as a member of international advisory board for drafting Iraq's constitution.

My first question is about Iran and the elections. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been characterized an anti-reform hardliner and perhaps one of the people who participated in the hostage crisis. What is your assessment of Ahmadinejad and how the elections were conducted?

Dr. Abdulaziz Sachedina: It is true that Ahmadinejad is not that well known in Iran except in his capacity as the mayor of Tehran. His policies are unfolding gradually because during the campaign his statements were not very different from statements made by other candidates. But he is certainly not ultra-conservative the way he has been portrayed in the US media. If anything, his background as a basiji (those committed to deliver services as part of their religious commitment, including, if necessary, in defense of the motherland), makes him prone to seek quick solutions to the pressing problems of corruption that face the entire government machinery in Iran.

We do know that he is a deeply religious man but that does not mean that he is conservative. He might even prove to be more progressive. So it is rather a media concoction in some ways and a speculation that since he comes out of that particular background basiji (who also happen to be diehard supporters of the religious establishment), that he too must be ultraconservative.

Now as for the elections, they are a show of the people's power and their effort to tell the religious establishment that they cannot impose their candidate upon them. The electoral made a clear statement to the government, and to the religious establishment that they would not abide by their wishes. The religious establishment wanted to see (former President Akbar Hashemi) Rafsanjani come to power, but the people voted him out of the candidacy. There is no doubt that as an elderly statesman Rafsanjani still wields lot of clout and influence in Iranian politics.

So Ahmadinejad's election is quite unique. Tehran, which determines the major trends in the national politics saw quite a turn out of women voters who voted for Ahmadinejad ó despite speculation that he might bring stricter rules about their head scarves. The reason was that even the women wanted to make a statement to the religious establishment that they would not listen to them.

We can see that democratic culture in Iran has really taken deeper roots in the last twenty five years, that is, since the revolution in 1978-79. Imam Khomeini, who started this whole movement of Islamic republic, has been in a way a prelude to ultimate democratization and sensitization about the people's political rights. After all it is an exercise of political rights that people can vote and tell the government that they do matter.

As for the election campaigns, what we noticed was that Rafsanjani had to plead to the people just as anyone else would plead for the vote of the people. This was clearly unthinkable that a member of the religious establishment ó a conservative, turbaned politician ó would have to plead to the people like any other candidate to come to power.

In the beginning of the revolution, it was almost assumed that the religious class will always hold on to power, limitlessly and endlessly. It was quite revealing that during the last elections people showed what they could do ñ exactly as predicted by Imam Khomeini in his assessment of the power of the populace.

What I have discovered up to now in the choice of the candidates for the cabinet (of Ahmadinejad) is not conservatism. Rather it is practical politics, giving chance to those who were marginalized and did not have a voice in the previous administrations. So, for example, the chancellor of Kirman University was appointed as a new minister of education. Certainly he did not have the experience and was not confirmed by the parliament, but it shows that Ahmadinejad chose among those who are ordinary, decent human beings, representing the simple and yet credible voices in the society.

In fact, when Ahmadinejad held his first cabinet meeting Mashad, it was held on the floor. All the ministers sat around and it showed the style of Ahmadinejad's administration, his devotion to simplicity, and his ability to earn the respect of the people. Ordinary people of Iran are very excited to see a change because for long the religious class behaved like a special class with special privileges - their own chauffeurs, and all other trappings that go with political power and economic corruption. It is refreshing to find an ordinary, car-driving mayor of Tehran, who holds cabinet meetings on the floor, and who now has become the President. It's a kind of image that is unthinkable in the Third World politics.

The whole election process shows a peaceful transference of power, which does not happen often in the Third World countries. What it demonstrates is the people's involvement in the political process and in the deeply rooted democratic culture that influences them to actively seek change through the ballot.

One of the critiques when the words Iran and democracy are used in the same sentence is what about women? People wonder how a country be considered democratic if that government imposes a dress code upon its women? First on a theoretical level, can a country be considered democratic and also impose the hijab? Second, do you think there will be a reexamination of hijab under Ahmadinejad? It appears that many women would like to see this occur.

AS: I think that we miss a point when we speak about the veil or hijab as a symbol of suppression and oppression of women's identity, etc. Do women in Iran see it that way? This is an important issue that we have not tried to understand or discover. I don't think that democracy is somehow sacrificed if the majority of the people decide that this is the way they want their public space to be occupied by women who observe modesty code. Moreover, I don't think it is an issue that harms the democratic principles of legal equality.

But there is a lot of public debate in Iran on the hijab and the notion of whether anyone can impose it, even what is regarded as minimum hijab. The modern hijab that is prevalent in Iran among the upper and well-to-do classes does not even qualify as a religiously ordained hijab anymore. Since Khatami took office what constitutes the hijab has been gradually relaxed in Iran ñ what constitutes "minimum" hijab according to the jurists is gradually disappearing.

The question now for the women is: Would this relaxed attitude to hijab be reversed under Ahmadinejad? I don't think that the gains that women had under the Khatami regime would be taken away by the new regime or his cabinet. After Ahmadinejad's electoral victory, some of his supporters wanted greater monitoring on women's dress but Ahmadinejad immediately rejected this as intruding in the autonomy of women.

Iran is criticized for two things. First the treatment of women and second the treatment of its minorities, specifically Sunnis, Bahais, and Jews. Do you see an attempt to address abuses against these communities within Iran?

AS: Certainly. I think there is lot of sensitivity and public debate about human rights and what Iran is supposed to do to address these concerns.

On the one hand, when the state becomes ideological and it adopts a particular school of thought, it creates automatic mechanisms of discrimination against those who might not be contributing towards its ideological stance. I am referring to the Sunni community that finds itself having to bow down to the requirements of the state ideology which is Shiite. In the schools, for example, there is freedom to teach Sunni Islam but that is curtailed in some school systems. In other words, the state curriculum is not inclusive when it comes to religious instruction.

Now in other parts, in Turkmen areas of the Caspian provinces, for example, this is not the case. So in some parts where the population is Sunni the rights of the minority are observed and in other places they are not. There is a need for consistency in this matter. After all, Islamic Umma, includes all Muslims, and not just the Shiite or the Sunni.

Recently, I was told by the Sunni students in the Ferdowsi University that the only Sunni mosque in Mashhad, located in the Afghan refugee area was destroyed by the Iranian government. After speaking to the mayor, following my return from Washington, I was informed that the mosque was used by al-Qa'ida and Taleban supporters to train the militants. As soon as that was discovered Iranian authorities took steps and destroyed the mosque. When I objected to this treatment of the mosque, the mayor informed me that the precedent was not very different from the Prophet's action when the Masjid al-Dirar was built in Medina to divide Muslims and spread sedition. Whether the precedent in the early history of Islam serves the action taken in Mashhad or not, it certainly shows the government's deep seated suspicion of the Afghan refugees, who happen to be Sunni in this particular area, and their link to al-Qai'da and Taleban militants, and hence, its harsh reaction to the link.

As far as Jewish communities are concerned, I think Jews fare well in Iran from all the evidence that we have. They have their businesses protected. They have representation in the parliament. And their places of worship are protected because the shariah affords them a clear status as a People of the Book. If there are instances of violation of their rights, they occur at the level of the population when people take law in their own hands.

When it comes to Bahais, they are not recognized as a religious minority; so they really stand outside any legal framework which is afforded to other minorities. But, according to the recent developments in the political culture of Iran, the Bahais are now actively engaged in preaching their religion, however discreetly. So this is a new trend.

Do think that improvements still need to be made in the treatment of Bahais?

AS: There should be an improvement, of course. Part of the problem is a conceptual description of the Bahais as being originally a dissenting group from Islamic umma, hence, termed as apostates. There has to be a clear category of affording them a religious minority status and accepting Bahaism as another religion. Many of the ulama consider Bahais as Shiites who have seceded from the Shia community, and therefore, they are legally classified as murtad, or apostates. It is this perception and characterization that blocks their acceptance as a fully respected minority community. Since Bahais regard themselves as a separate religion, then I think the ulama have to come to grips with this reality from a legal stance and afford them a status of religious minority.

One of the challenges in speaking about Iran is that very little is known about Iran. What we do hear are the experiences of the Iranian Diaspora that came during the revolution or from the clerical class who are often quoted in the US media. So the discussion is polarized and I would argue, misinformed by both "sides." What can be done to add more complexity to discussions of Iran yet still remain critical?

AS: There are two elements that are very much the source of misinformation about Iran. One is the expatriate community that was under the shah a privileged class of the society, who lost property, and even members of their families, who were killed, or have been imprisoned. All these things have added to their bitterness against the present regime; so when they speak about Iran they speak nothing but negatively. And partly it is negative propaganda by them trying to show the worst possible image of Iran that has been picked up by the media. They hate the religious establishment and they make sweeping statements about the entire nation, including Islam. That's one source of misinformation.

The second reason is the political assessment of the US government. Under the Bush administration, Iran is characterized as part of the "axis of evil." Since the time the hostages were taken in 1979-80, that negative evaluation of Iran has remained in the collective subconscious of America. It plays itself out in different ways and the US foreign policy continues to see Iran as anti-American, anti-Israel and determines American relation to Iran accordingly.

But Iran is a strategic country in that region. It shares border with Iraq, with Afghanistan and Iran has remained neutral in the affairs of Afghanistan and Iraq and this is never acknowledged in the State Department. Iran could unsettle Iraq much easily than Washington is willing to concede. It has deep cultural and religious roots in Iraq. And, yet, we have seen nothing but non-interventionist policies from Tehran.

While there seems to be a rise throughout the Muslim world in anti-Americanism, in Iran there appears to be an effort to push towards warmer relations with America, especially on the part of the youth. What do you make of this?

AS: The Iranians love America but they hate the American administration and its policies. In the last election, one of the internal debates was whether the people of Iran should vote or not. Many people in Iran did want to vote because they view the present government as having no legitimacy. One of the ways of protesting this illegitimacy was abstaining to participate in the political process under this regime.

However, and rather ironically, with one negative statement of Mr. Bush that Iranian elections were undemocratic and that the people should not vote for a theocracy, the Iranian people were outraged. Their voted and voted in millions to tell Mr. Bush: 'We will go and vote just because America does not want us to vote.' Even those who are opposed to affording the Iranian government legitimacy went out and voted for this government. So it is a reaction to what America does.

But the criticism towards America is actually towards its policies, not its people. Iranians love America because there are thousands of Iranians here. Often very religious people tell me that the way Americans behave is closer to true Islam than the way Iranians behave in Iran. 'We have Islam but we do not behave as Muslims,' they say. 'And Americans don't have Islam but they behave as Muslims.' Is this true, they ask me? My response is always to the point that there are so many good things in America that reflect a better understanding of Islam.

Do you think the stern imposition of Islam in Iran turns people away from Islam?

AS: Practically it has turned away the youths from Islam. The Iranian public is deeply religious and spiritual, including the youths. There is a deep religious feeling among the youth and yet they do not like the official religiosity of the state because that Islam is being imposed on them and they are resisting it.

I would say that this is a dangerous trend. By identifying Islam totally with the members of religious establishment, I think, the youth are rejecting some of the good things about Islam as well. After all, Islam has no official clergy and each individual is invited to understand his/her religion independent of the official "church." It is unfortunate that Shiism in Iran functions not unlike official church!

Lets move on to Iraq. I know you studied there in the 1960s in Najaf and repeatedly visit up until today. Some say a civil war may erupt if the constitution is not approved. What is your assessment of the relations between Iraq's various religious and ethnic communities?

AS: I think relations between two main communities, that is, the Shiites and the Sunnis, are getting worse day by day. Let me make a distinction between the Iraqi Shiite and Sunni communities and the larger Arab Sunni community. Certainly the relationship between the Iraq Arab Shiites and Arab Sunnites is not the way it is projected in the US media. Historically, the two communities have lived in peace and cooperation, as long as the minority Sunni (20%) ruled Iraq. Now that the equation has changed against the Sunni minority, the Arab Sunnis from all over the Arab world seem to be determined not to allow the Arab Shiite majority to form the government as a majority and to allow democracy to flourish in Iraq.

With the growing ferocity of the Sunni insurgents (made up of mainly the non-Iraqi Arab Sunnis) in killing innocent civilians indiscriminately, it is doubtful if the October 15 referendum will succeed in getting the approval of the Sunni community of Iraq. This abstaining will occur mainly due to the fear of the threats made by the Sunni insurgents. At the same time there is more and more demand being made by the followers of Muqtada Sadr to retaliate against the insurgents and in some instances there has been a Shiite retaliation. Hence, what appeared to many of us, who know the Iraqi situation more intimately, as promising in summer has evaporated in assessing the real situation on the ground at this time.

What about foreign intervention in this process?

AS: There is a lot of Sunni Arab intervention. The Sunni Arab governments in the region understandably do not want to see Iraqi democracy under Shiite dominance succeed for two basic reasons: one is up until the invasion of Iraq they had created a fiction that there were no Arab Shia in Iraq. These Shiites, as they claimed in agreement with Saddam, were Iranians, who should be and were repatriated by force to Iran. Hence it's politically unacceptable to them to concede that 60% of Iraq who happen to be Shiite were dominated very brutally by the 20% Sunni Iraqis. The second fiction is that the Shiite element in Iraq is that since the Shiites are originally Iranian they will naturally forge an alliance with Iran and destabilize the region. The facts have emerged quite to the contrary. The Shiites of Iraq are ethnically and even in ethos different from the Shiites of Iran. Yes they believe in the same doctrines but the way they see their role in the larger Muslim world and particularly Arab world is very different. Iran has a very distinct understanding of Islam. Even their ritualistic leanings are different than the Iraqi Shiite. In Mashhad, where Iraqis and Iranians commemorate Muharram and Ashura, the Shiites of Iraq have their own gatherings, their own ways of observing it, and they celebrate these rituals in their own centers. So imagine even in the commonest denominator which is the ritualistic observation, the Iraqis stand out as different.

The assessment we get in the media, therefore, is contrary to my own experience of living in Iraq and Iran and having dealt with both the Sunnis and Shiites there. What we see in Iraq, therefore, is that the two communities have lived side by side, conducted businesses together, and have also intermarried. There is no animosity of the kind that we observe in the South Asia. In Baghdad the Sunni and the Shiites have lived together for centuries. The Sunni-Shiite riots that take place in Pakistan are unknown in Iraq. Yes, Sadaam did try to destroy the Shiite community as much as he could do; but that was a tyrannical political power trying to wipe out a wronged majority lest it tries to overthrow him. The ordinary people living together have not been so antagonistic to one another.

But do you see a rise in antagonism?

AS: I don't think so. I don't think so. The Sunni insurgency in Iraq is actually being masterminded from outside. There are Jordanians, Syrians, Egyptians, and Saudis involved. And Iraqi government has found evidence of the foreign involvement in encouraging this. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, for example, is a Jordanian and it is he who has sworn to harm the Shiites in Iraq.

What do you thin the US role should be? Should the US pull out or remain or perhaps even increase its forces?

AS: The choices are very limited for the US. It cannot withdraw without creating a vacuum of security for the country. So that choice is out of the question. But I think the US cannot continue to be there timelessly because occupation is not palatable to the Iraqi Sunnis or Shias. Period. They want to see that the occupation ends.

The US role at the moment has been to leave the matters very much in the hands of the Iraqis. They realized very quickly they cannot impose their will, even in constitutional matters. Hence, during the drafting of the constitution the Iraqi delegates made it very clear that they wanted Islamic values to be part of the Iraqi constitution whether the US likes it or not. The fact is that the US cannot really impose its will because the colonial past is too recent to be forgotten by the Iraqis or any Arab or Muslim peoples. The situation was different in Afghanistan because not only was (Hamid) Karzai imposed on the nation but also many other things were imposed externally on Afghanistan, the reaction to which is unfolding.

Such is not the case of Iraq. No Iraqi will accept any imposition from outside. Very early on the American plan to impose Ahmad Chalabi proved this point. Iraq will continue to mystify US policy makers. It's a different type of ball that the US has to play.

How should we engage the issue as Muslim-Americans?

AS: We are Americans and we have a responsibility as citizens of this country to be aware of its security and of its goals that might conflict sometimes with our personal beliefs. But as Muslims we must morally assist the US government to see these things with a very clear conscience. Now as Muslims we don't like, for example, destruction of property anywhere in the world, including Iraq. We don't like to see that Iraqi life is being taking lightly by our US administration. At the same time, there has to be recognition in the Arab world that there was very little done to curtail the cruelty of Saddam Hussein. For a long time, no one was willing to condemn him. Even after the mass graves that were discovered to indicate the number of the Shiites who have been destroyedóthere was no Arab government that really criticized Saddam's government the way it had inhumanly treated the Shiite majority. It is ironic that today everybody is talking about the Sunni minority in Iraq and how their rights must be protected. Where were they when the rights of the majority were not only violated, but thousands were also destroyed? I think we as American Muslims should avoid these double standards in our ethical judgment.

We as American Muslims must stand firm on ethical principles and judge the performance of all our people without a bias so that we do not fall prey to our own self-glorification and self-righteousness under different governments. We know our governments did not behave well, including Saddam, towards the Shiites. We know that Saudi Arabia still does not treat its Shiite population with justice and fairness. So if we are speaking up today against American atrocities, we should also be speaking up against the Muslim atrocities against fellow Muslims, whether Shiite or Sunni.

I think what we need to remember is that our ethical and moral responsibility should be uncompromising. We appear to be ethically sensitive. Consequently, on some issues we talk about ethical absoluteness and on other equally troubling issues we tend to be morally relativistsówhatever serves our purposes. That's not the way we Muslims should be. We should judge and assess the situation in all fairness and absolute ethical commitment.

But people say that now that the Shiites are in power, they will create an Islamic state, possibly a theocracy, and will marginalize other communities, especially Sunnis.

AS: They will not do that. There is no such plan. A majority community in Iraq has lived as a "minority" community long enough to learn the strategies of survival. They have been less confrontational in this sense, even under Saddam's very harsh regime! I think the Shiites of Iraq have a unique way of accommodating their principles to the practicalities of the situation because of their particular history under Saddam.

What about fears of Shia crescent forming? The rise in Shia political power in Iraq has created fears of proselytizing by Shias.

Lebanon was supposed to be an extremist state because of the Hizbullah. But the Shiites are proving to be tolerant and accommodating. The crescent of the Shiite evil, as put forth by King Abdullah of Jordan, who was the first person to speak about an "evil" Shiite crescent, completely lost picture of the relationship between Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon. But we are seeing very clearly that the Lebanese Shiites are acting very independently. Shaikh Fadlallah, one of the Shiite leaders in Lebanon, for example, is not accepted by Iran. But who knows whether Abdulaziz Hakim would be acceptable to Iran.

But will there be an adoption of Wilayat al Faqih and an Iranian paradigm of governance?

No not at all. One of the reasons why Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim (d. 2004) lost favor in Iran was that Iran could not indoctrinate him. He had his own views of what multi-ethnic and multifaith Iraq would look like and Iran did not favor this view. He was marginalized in Iran just as Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah is marginalized in Iran today.

There is no paradigm of governance that they have in front of them except a secular Islamic state. They are talking about a secular Islamic state.

You don't think that's a contradiction in terms?

AS: I don't think so because Islam does support functional secularity ñ some kind of separation of jurisdictions that allows religion to remain beyond government's intervention. These separate jurisdictions allow the necessary freedoms for all citizens. You need to take care of the people's cultures, respect them, give them religious freedom and at the same time insist that they are citizens of the same country. That cannot be done without acknowledging some degree of secularity. Religious leaders in Iraq know this very well.

Zahir Janmohamed is the founder and co-director of the Qunoot Foundation, a Washington DC organization that seeks to create a platform for Muslim youth. To listen Dr. Sachedina's complete lecture on the recent elections in Iran, listen to Janmohamed's podcast Qunoot on iTunes.

Interview with Dr. Sachedina

2005-10-07T14:46:00.000-04:00

On Thursday, September 1, The Qunoot Foundation's Zahir Janmohamed interviewed Dr. Abdulaziz Sachedina while Dr. Sachedina was visiting Washington DC for a series of meetings and lectures.

Dr. Sachedina is Francis Ball Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Virginia. He is currently on a one-year Sabbatical in Iran where he is teaching in the Department of Theology and Islamic Studies at the Ferdowsi University of Mashhad. He has most recently been active as a member of international advisory board for drafting Iraq’s constitution.

TQF: My first question is about Iran and the elections. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been characterized an anti-reform hardliner and perhaps one of the people who participated in the hostage crisis. What is your assessment of Ahmadinejad and how the elections were conducted?

AS: It is true that Ahmadinejad is not that well known in Iran except in his capacity as the mayor of Tehran. His policies are unfolding gradually because during the campaign his statements were not very different from statements made by other candidates. But he is certainly not ultra-conservative the way he has been portrayed in the US media. If anything, his background as a basiji (those committed to deliver services as part of their religious commitment, including, if necessary, in defense of the motherland), makes him prone to seek quick solutions to the pressing problems of corruption that face the entire government machinery in Iran.

We do know that he is a deeply religious man but that does not mean that he is conservative. He might even prove to be more progressive. So it is rather a media concoction in some ways and a speculation that since he comes out of that particular background basiji (who also happen to be diehard supporters of the religious establishment), that he too must be ultraconservative.

Now as for the elections, they are a show of the people’s power and their effort to tell the religious establishment that they cannot impose their candidate upon them. The electoral made a clear statement to the government, and to the religious establishment that they would not abide by their wishes. The religious establishment wanted to see (former President Akbar Hashemi) Rafsanjani come to power, but the people voted him out of the candidacy. There is no doubt that as an elderly statesman Rafsanjani still wields lot of clout and influence in Iranian politics.

So Ahmadinejad’s election is quite unique. Tehran, which determines the major trends in the national politics saw quite a turn out of women voters who voted for Ahmadinejad —despite speculation that he might bring stricter rules about their head scarves. The reason was that even the women wanted to make a statement to the religious establishment that they would not listen to them.

We can see that democratic culture in Iran has really taken deeper roots in the last twenty five years, that is, since the revolution in 1978-79. Imam Khomeini, who started this whole movement of Islamic republic, has been in a way a prelude to ultimate democratization and sensitization about the people’s political rights. After all it is an exercise of political rights that people can vote and tell the government that they do matter.

As for the election campaigns, what we noticed was that Rafsanjani had to plead to the people just as anyone else would plead for the vote of the people. This was clearly unthinkable that a member of the religious establishment—a conservative, turbaned politician—would have to plead to the people like any other candidate to come to power.

In the beginning of the revolution, it was almost assumed that the religious class will always hold on to power, limitlessly and endlessly. It was quite revealing that during the last elections people showed what they could do – exactly as predicted by Imam Khomeini in his assessment of the power of the populace.

What I have discovered up to now in the choice of the candidates for the cabinet (of Ahmadinejad) is not conservatism. Rather it is practical politics, giving chance to those who were marginalized and did not have a voice in the previous administrations. So, for example, the chancellor of Kirman University was appointed as a new minister of education. Certainly he did not have the experience and was not confirmed by the parliament, but it shows that Ahmadinejad chose among those who are ordinary, decent human beings, representing the simple and yet credible voices in the society.

In fact, when Ahmadinejad held his first cabinet meeting Mashad, it was held on the floor. All the ministers sat around and it showed the style of Ahmadinejad’s administration, his devotion to simplicity, and his ability to earn the respect of the people. Ordinary people of Iran are very excited to see a change because for long the religious class behaved like a special class with special privileges - their own chauffeurs, and all other trappings that go with political power and economic corruption. It is refreshing to find an ordinary, car-driving mayor of Tehran, who holds cabinet meetings on the floor, and who now has become the President. It’s a kind of image that is unthinkable in the Third World politics.

The whole election process shows a peaceful transference of power, which does not happen often in the Third World countries. What it demonstrates is the people’s involvement in the political process and in the deeply rooted democratic culture that influences them to actively seek change through the ballot.

TQF: One of the critiques when the words Iran and democracy are used in the same sentence is what about women? People wonder how a country be considered democratic if that government imposes a dress code upon its women? First on a theoretical level, can a country be considered democratic and also impose the hijab? Second, do you think there will be a reexamination of hijab under Ahmadinejad? It appears that many women would like to see this occur.

AS: I think that we miss a point when we speak about the veil or hijab as a symbol

of suppression and oppression of women’s identity, etc. Do women in Iran see it that way? This is an important issue that we have not tried to understand or discover. I don’t think that democracy is somehow sacrificed if the majority of the people decide that this is the way they want their public space to be occupied by women who observe modesty code. Moreover, I don’t think it is an issue that harms the democratic principles of legal equality.

But there is a lot of public debate in Iran on the hijab and the notion of whether anyone can impose it, even what is regarded as minimum hijab. The modern hijab that is prevalent in Iran among the upper and well-to-do classes does not even qualify as a religiously ordained hijab anymore. Since Khatami took office what constitutes the hijab has been gradually relaxed in Iran – what constitutes “minimum” hijab according to the jurists is gradually disappearing.

The question now for the women is: Would this relaxed attitude to hijab be reversed under Ahmadinejad? I don’t think that the gains that women had under the Khatami regime would be taken away by the new regime or his cabinet. After Ahmadinejad’s electoral victory, some of his supporters wanted greater monitoring on women’s dress but Ahmadinejad immediately rejected this as intruding in the autonomy of women.

TQF: Iran is criticized for two things. First the treatment of women and second the treatment of its minorities, specifically Sunnis, Bahais, and Jews. Do you see an attempt to address abuses against these communities within Iran?

AS: Certainly. I think there is lot of sensitivity and public debate about human rights and what Iran is supposed to do to address these concerns.

On the one hand, when the state becomes ideological and it adopts a particular school of thought, it creates automatic mechanisms of discrimination against those who might not be contributing towards its ideological stance. I am referring to the Sunni community that finds itself having to bow down to the requirements of the state ideology which is Shiite. In the schools, for example, there is freedom to teach Sunni Islam but that is curtailed in some school systems. In other words, the state curriculum is not inclusive when it comes to religious instruction.

Now in other parts, in Turkmen areas of the Caspian provinces, for example, this is not the case. So in some parts where the population is Sunni the rights of the minority are observed and in other places they are not. There is a need for consistency in this matter. After all, Islamic Umma, includes all Muslims, and not just the Shiite or the Sunni.

Recently, I was told by the Sunni students in the Ferdowsi University that the only Sunni mosque in Mashhad, located in the Afghan refugee area was destroyed by the Iranian government. After speaking to the mayor, following my return from Washington, I was informed that the mosque was used by al-Qa’ida and Taleban supporters to train the militants. As soon as that was discovered Iranian authorities took steps and destroyed the mosque. When I objected to this treatment of the mosque, the mayor informed me that the precedent was not very different from the Prophet’s action when the Masjid al-Dirar was built in Medina to divide Muslims and spread sedition. Whether the precedent in the early history of Islam serves the action taken in Mashhad or not, it certainly shows the government’s deep seated suspicion of the Afghan refugees, who happen to be Sunni in this particular area, and their link to al-Qai’da and Taleban militants, and hence, its harsh reaction to the link.

As far as Jewish communities are concerned, I think Jews fare well in Iran from all the evidence that we have. They have their businesses protected. They have representation in the parliament. And their places of worship are protected because the shariah affords them a clear status as a People of the Book. If there are instances of violation of their rights, they occur at the level of the population when people take law in their own hands.

When it comes to Bahais, they are not recognized as a religious minority; so they really stand outside any legal framework which is afforded to other minorities. But, according to the recent developments in the political culture of Iran, the Bahais are now actively engaged in preaching their religion, however discreetly. So this is a new trend.

TQF: Do think that improvements still need to be made in the treatment of Bahais?

There should be an improvement, of course. Part of the problem is a conceptual description of the Bahais as being originally a dissenting group from Islamic umma, hence, termed as apostates. There has to be a clear category of affording them a religious minority status and accepting Bahaism as another religion. Many of the ulama consider Bahais as Shiites who have seceded from the Shia community, and therefore, they are legally classified as murtad, or apostates. It is this perception and characterization that blocks their acceptance as a fully respected minority community. Since Bahais regard themselves as a separate religion, then I think the ulama have to come to grips with this reality from a legal stance and afford them a status of religious minority.

TQF: One of the challenges in speaking about Iran is that very little is known about Iran. What we do hear are the experiences of the Iranian Diaspora that came during the revolution or from the clerical class who are often quoted in the US media. So the discussion is polarized and I would argue, misinformed by both “sides.” What can be done to add more complexity to discussions of Iran yet still remain critical?

AS: There are two elements that are very much the source of misinformation about Iran. One is the expatriate community that was under the shah a privileged class of the society, who lost property, and even members of their families, who were killed, or have been imprisoned. All these things have added to their bitterness against the present regime; so when they speak about Iran they speak nothing but negatively. And partly it is negative propaganda by them trying to show the worst possible image of Iran that has been picked up by the media. They hate the religious establishment and they make sweeping statements about the entire nation, including Islam. That’s one source of misinformation.

The second reason is the political assessment of the US government. Under the Bush administration, Iran is characterized as part of the “axis of evil.” Since the time the hostages were taken in 1979-80, that negative evaluation of Iran has remained in the collective subconscious of America. It plays itself out in different ways and the US foreign policy continues to see Iran as anti-American, anti-Israel and determines American relation to Iran accordingly.

But Iran is a strategic country in that region. It shares border with Iraq, with Afghanistan and Iran has remained neutral in the affairs of Afghanistan and Iraq and this is never acknowledged in the State Department. Iran could unsettle Iraq much easily than Washington is willing to concede. It has deep cultural and religious roots in Iraq. And, yet, we have seen nothing but non-interventionist policies from Tehran.

TQF: While there seems to be a rise throughout the Muslim world in anti-Americanism, in Iran there appears to be an effort to push towards warmer relations with America, especially on the part of the youth. What do you make of this?

AS: The Iranians love America but they hate the American administration and its policies. In the last election, one of the internal debates was whether the people of Iran should vote or not. Many people in Iran did want to vote because they view the present government as having no legitimacy. One of the ways of protesting this illegitimacy was abstaining to participate in the political process under this regime.

However, and rather ironically, with one negative statement of Mr. Bush that Iranian elections were undemocratic and that the people should not vote for a theocracy, the Iranian people were outraged. Their voted and voted in millions to tell Mr. Bush: ‘We will go and vote just because America does not want us to vote.’ Even those who are opposed to affording the Iranian government legitimacy went out and voted for this government. So it is a reaction to what America does.

But the criticism towards America is actually towards its policies, not its people. Iranians love America because there are thousands of Iranians here. Often very religious people tell me that the way Americans behave is closer to true Islam than the way Iranians behave in Iran. ‘We have Islam but we do not behave as Muslims,’ they say. ‘And Americans don’t have Islam but they behave as Muslims.’ Is this true, they ask me? My response is always to the point that there are so many good things in America that reflect a better understanding of Islam.

TQF: Do you think the stern imposition of Islam in Iran turns people away from Islam?

Practically it has turned away the youths from Islam. The Iranian public is deeply religious and spiritual, including the youths. There is a deep religious feeling among the youth and yet they do not like the official religiosity of the state because that Islam is being imposed on them and they are resisting it.

I would say that this is a dangerous trend. By identifying Islam totally with the members of religious establishment, I think, the youth are rejecting some of the good things about Islam as well. After all, Islam has no official clergy and each individual is invited to understand his/her religion independent of the official “church.” It is unfortunate that Shiism in Iran functions not unlike official church!

TQF: Lets move on to Iraq. I know you studied there in the 1960s in Najaf and repeatedly visit up until today. Some say a civil war may erupt if the constitution is not approved. What is your assessment of the relations between Iraq’s various religious and ethnic communities?

AS: I think relations between two main communities, that is, the Shiites and the Sunnis, are getting worse day by day. Let me make a distinction between the Iraqi Shiite and Sunni communities and the larger Arab Sunni community. Certainly the relationship between the Iraq Arab Shiites and Arab Sunnites is not the way it is projected in the US media. Historically, the two communities have lived in peace and cooperation, as long as the minority Sunni (20%) ruled Iraq. Now that the equation has changed against the Sunni minority, the Arab Sunnis from all over the Arab world seem to be determined not to allow the Arab Shiite majority to form the government as a majority and to allow democracy to flourish in Iraq.

With the growing ferocity of the Sunni insurgents (made up of mainly the non-Iraqi Arab Sunnis) in killing innocent civilians indiscriminately, it is doubtful if the October 15 referendum will succeed in getting the approval of the Sunni community of Iraq. This abstaining will occur mainly due to the fear of the threats made by the Sunni insurgents. At the same time there is more and more demand being made by the followers of Muqtada Sadr to retaliate against the insurgents and in some instances there has been a Shiite retaliation. Hence, what appeared to many of us, who know the Iraqi situation more intimately, as promising in summer has evaporated in assessing the real situation on the ground at this time.

TQF: What about foreign intervention in this process?

There is a lot of Sunni Arab intervention. The Sunni Arab governments in the region understandably do not want to see Iraqi democracy under Shiite dominance succeed for two basic reasons: one is up until the invasion of Iraq they had created a fiction that there were no Arab Shia in Iraq. These Shiites, as they claimed in agreement with Saddam, were Iranians, who should be and were repatriated by force to Iran. Hence it’s politically unacceptable to them to concede that 60% of Iraq who happen to be Shiite were dominated very brutally by the 20% Sunni Iraqis. The second fiction is that the Shiite element in Iraq is that since the Shiites are originally Iranian they will naturally forge an alliance with Iran and destabilize the region. The facts have emerged quite to the contrary. The Shiites of Iraq are ethnically and even in ethos different from the Shiites of Iran. Yes they believe in the same doctrines but the way they see their role in the larger Muslim world and particularly Arab world is very different. Iran has a very distinct understanding of Islam. Even their ritualistic leanings are different than the Iraqi Shiite. In Mashhad, where Iraqis and Iranians commemorate Muharram and Ashura, the Shiites of Iraq have their own gatherings, their own ways of observing it, and they celebrate these rituals in their own centers. So imagine even in the commonest denominator which is the ritualistic observation, the Iraqis stand out as different.

The assessment we get in the media, therefore, is contrary to my own experience of living in Iraq and Iran and having dealt with both the Sunnis and Shiites there. What we see in Iraq, therefore, is that the two communities have lived side by side, conducted businesses together, and have also intermarried. There is no animosity of the kind that we observe in the South Asia. In Baghdad the Sunni and the Shiites have lived together for centuries. The Sunni-Shiite riots that take place in Pakistan are unknown in Iraq. Yes, Sadaam did try to destroy the Shiite community as much as he could do; but that was a tyrannical political power trying to wipe out a wronged majority lest it tries to overthrow him. The ordinary people living together have not been so antagonistic to one another.

TQF: But do you see a rise in antagonism?

I don’t think so. I don’t think so. The Sunni insurgency in Iraq is actually being masterminded from outside. There are Jordanians, Syrians, Egyptians, and Saudis involved. And Iraqi government has found evidence of the foreign involvement in encouraging this. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, for example, is a Jordanian and it is he who has sworn to harm the Shiites in Iraq.

TQF: What do you thin the US role should be? Should the US pull out or remain or perhaps even increase its forces?

The choices are very limited for the US. It cannot withdraw without creating a vacuum of security for the country. So that choice is out of the question. But I think the US cannot continue to be there timelessly because occupation is not palatable to the Iraqi Sunnis or Shias. Period. They want to see that the occupation ends.

The US role at the moment has been to leave the matters very much in the hands of the Iraqis. They realized very quickly they cannot impose their will, even in constitutional matters. Hence, during the drafting of the constitution the Iraqi delegates made it very clear that they wanted Islamic values to be part of the Iraqi constitution whether the US likes it or not. The fact is that the US cannot really impose its will because the colonial past is too recent to be forgotten by the Iraqis or any Arab or Muslim peoples. The situation was different in Afghanistan because not only was (Hamid) Karzai imposed on the nation but also many other things were imposed externally on Afghanistan, the reaction to which is unfolding.

Such is not the case of Iraq. No Iraqi will accept any imposition from outside. Very early on the American plan to impose Ahmad Chalabi proved this point. Iraq will continue to mystify US policy makers. It’s a different type of ball that the US has to play.

TQF: How should we engage the issue as Muslim-Americans?

We are Americans and we have a responsibility as citizens of this country to be aware of its security and of its goals that might conflict sometimes with our personal beliefs. But as Muslims we must morally assist the US government to see these things with a very clear conscience. Now as Muslims we don’t like, for example, destruction of property anywhere in the world, including Iraq. We don’t like to see that Iraqi life is being taking lightly by our US administration. At the same time, there has to be recognition in the Arab world that there was very little done to curtail the cruelty of Saddam Hussein. For a long time, no one was willing to condemn him. Even after the mass graves that were discovered to indicate the number of the Shiites who have been destroyed—there was no Arab government that really criticized Saddam’s government the way it had inhumanly treated the Shiite majority. It is ironic that today everybody is talking about the Sunni minority in Iraq and how their rights must be protected. Where were they when the rights of the majority were not only violated, but thousands were also destroyed? I think we as American Muslims should avoid these double standards in our ethical judgment.

We as American Muslims must stand firm on ethical principles and judge the performance of all our people without a bias so that we do not fall prey to our own self-glorification and self-righteousness under different governments. We know our governments did not behave well, including Saddam, towards the Shiites. We know that Saudi Arabia still does not treat its Shiite population with justice and fairness. So if we are speaking up today against American atrocities, we should also be speaking up against the Muslim atrocities against fellow Muslims, whether Shiite or Sunni.

I think what we need to remember is that our ethical and moral responsibility should be uncompromising. We appear to be ethically sensitive. Consequently, on some issues we talk about ethical absoluteness and on other equally troubling issues we tend to be morally relativists—whatever serves our purposes. That’s not the way we Muslims should be. We should judge and assess the situation in all fairness and absolute ethical commitment.

TQF: But people say that now that the Shiites are in power, they will create an Islamic state, possibly a theocracy, and will marginalize other communities, especially Sunnis.

They will not do that. There is no such plan. A majority community in Iraq has lived as a “minority” community long enough to learn the strategies of survival. They have been less confrontational in this sense, even under Saddam’s very harsh regime! I think the Shiites of Iraq have a unique way of accommodating their principles to the practicalities of the situation because of their particular history under Saddam.

TQF: What about fears of Shia crescent forming? The rise in Shia political power in Iraq has created fears of proselytizing by Shias.

Lebanon was supposed to be an extremist state because of the Hizbullah. But the Shiites are proving to be tolerant and accommodating. The crescent of the Shiite evil, as put forth by King Abdullah of Jordan, who was the first person to speak about an “evil” Shiite crescent, completely lost picture of the relationship between Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon. But we are seeing very clearly that the Lebanese Shiites are acting very independently. Shaikh Fadlallah, one of the Shiite leaders in Lebanon, for example, is not accepted by Iran. But who knows whether Abdulaziz Hakim would be acceptable to Iran.

TQF: But will there be an adoption of Wilayat al Faqih and an Iranian paradigm of governance?

No not at all. One of the reasons why Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim (d. 2004) lost favor in Iran was that Iran could not indoctrinate him. He had his own views of what multi-ethnic and multifaith Iraq would look like and Iran did not favor this view. He was marginalized in Iran just as Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah is marginalized in Iran today.

There is no paradigm of governance that they have in front of them except a secular Islamic state. They are talking about a secular Islamic state.

TQF: You don’t think that’s a contradiction in terms?

I don’t think so because Islam does support functional secularity – some kind of separation of jurisdictions that allows religion to remain beyond government’s intervention. These separate jurisdictions allow the necessary freedoms for all citizens. You need to take care of the people’s cultures, respect them, give them religious freedom and at the same time insist that they are citizens of the same country. That cannot be done without acknowledging some degree of secularity. Religious leaders in Iraq know this very well.

Zahir Janmohamed is the co-director of the Qunoot Foundation. For more, check out www.qunoot.org

To listen Dr. Sachedina’s complete lecture on the recent elections in Iran, listen to the Qunoot Media podcast on iTunes.

An Unwelcome Change

2005-10-05T12:32:00.000-04:00

posted by Najam Haider

The recent decision by the Iraqi parliament to change the requirements for the passage of a new Constitution do not bode well for the country's political stability.

Specifically, the Shi'a dominated government altered a provision which declared that the draft constitution could be vetoed by a 2/3 "no" vote in three Iraqi provinces. The new language requires 2/3 or ALL REGISTERED voters, effectively insuring passage as low turnout is expected in most majority-Sunni provinces. To put it another way, if EVERY SINGLE vote cast in three Iraqi provinces is against the constitution and the overall turnout is 60% of registered voters, it would still not be enough to veto the constitution. For purposes of comparison, keep in mind that the last US presidential election had an overall turnout of only 55.3%. In addition to the near-mathematical impossibility of rejection under the new rules, the US has launched another major offensive in Sunni-dominated Western provinces which will only serve to depress the turnout in these regions for the October 15 vote.

The new rules threaten to alienate a Sunni population that already feels powerless in the new Iraqi political order. Most moderate Iraqi Sunnis are willing to work with the new government but moves such as this one threaten to drive them into the ranks of extremist groups like al-Qaeda who have maintained that the Constitution is simply a US-inspired political ploy.

The Washington Times quotes Saleh al-Mutlaq, a leading Sunni politician, as considering a total boycott "because we believe that participating in the voting might be a useless act." While it is true that the Shi'a suffered disproportionately under the fist of Baathism oppression over the last 25 years, it is vital for their leadership to understand the importance of a cross-sectarian and cross-cultural coalition for the future of a united Iraq.

By altering the rules so close to a vote and explicitly marginalizing the Sunni population, the Shi'a political leadership is perilously close to playing into the hands of al-Qaeda and other extremists intent on characterizing them as puppets for US military domination. If that perception takes hold in the general Iraqi Sunni population, a bloody civil war is all but inevitable.

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