Deconstructing Ajami's Latest
from Najam HaiderLast Wednesday, Fouad Ajami, once again graced us with an article in editorial pages of the Wall Street Journal. The piece begins with a discussion of Abu Musad al-Zarqawi's relentless campaign within Iraq that mainly targets Shi'a as collaborators with the American opposition. He notes that Zarqawi "is a holy warrior on behalf of a wider Arab world that has averted its gaze from his crimes, that has given him its silent approval."
Disparaging Arab reactions to political developments within Iraq, he maintains that the crux of opposition lies in the fear of a new-born Shi'a/Kurd dominiated state with the potential for changing the political landscape of the Middle East ("An Iraqi polity with a modern social contract would be a rebuke to all that Egypt - and the rest of the Arab world - stands for..."). Finally, he argues that the Shi'a have traditionally been scapegoated by idealogues of hatred like Zarqawi and do not seek to create a theocratic state in the image of Iran.
Leaving aside Ajami's Bernard Lewis-esque assertions about "the Arabs" as a monolithic faceless mob with "an addiction to failure" and a "culture of shame," his argument can be reduced to two main points:
1. Zarqawi has widespread support within the Arab world exemplified by the lack of a vocal opposition to his attacks on Shi'a. While this statement may be correct in the context of American and European media coverage, the fact is that the attacks have seriously divided the global Jihadist movement and led to a seriously decline in popular support for Zarqawi. Evidence for this can be found in a recent article by NYU Professor Bernard Haykel who writes, "Zarqawi’s mentor, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (aka `Asim al-Barqawi), has expressed his unease about the strategy deployed by the Jihadis in Iraq... making the case that the killing of ordinary Shiites is not permitted in Islam... and moreover that suicide bombing is a tactic to be used only in extreme and exceptional circumstances." Every indication points to a decline in the global popularity and cohesiveness of the Jihadi movement in the aftermath of these attacks. Where, then is the silence, when Zarqawi's mentor himself is condemning attacks of Shi'a?
2. The primary cause of opposition to the government of Iraq lies in the empowerment of the Shi'a and the Kurds. While there is no doubt that Ajami is correct is detecting a hesitation on the part of dictatorial Nationalist government in dealing with the new Iraqi state, he assumes that the government is an independent state free of outside political control. In reality, the national government is primarily composed of exiles with little legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi people (not to mention Arabs in other countries) while local leaders are laregly powerless. The recent incident in Basra where British forces destroyed a prison facility to free soldiers being held on domestic charges is evidence for the complete disempowerment of local structures of power. Ajami makes no mention of the power dynamic of 150,000 occupying troops and its impact on Arab perceptions of the Iraqi government. Let us also keep in mind that the Shi'a were central to the formation of the Baathist Party in Iraq (see Yitzakh Nakhash's The Shia of Iraq), fought as ARABS against the Iranians in the Iran-Iraq War, and help high positions in the government and Baathist party leading up to the crackdowns in 1992. Arab Nationalism in Iraq was traditionally tinged with a Shi'i flavor.
Ajami is absolutely correct in assessing the tactics used by Zarqawi against Shi'i civilians. He is also correct is detecting a skepticism on the part of the wider Arab world with respect to the new Iraqi government. It's a shame, however, that instead of placing these development in a nuanced wider political context, he chooses to manipulate it to support a laregly essentialist misreading of Islamic (and Arab) history.


